If a Lion Could Talk by Stephen Budiansky, Free Press, 拢20, ISBN
0684837102
TURNING Ludwig Wittgenstein鈥檚 dictum 鈥淚f a lion could talk, we would not
understand him鈥� on its head, Stephen Budiansky argues that if a lion could talk,
we probably would understand him. It鈥檚 just that, through being able to talk, he
would not be a lion anymore. Budiansky follows philosopher Dan Dennett in
arguing that there are two kinds of mind: minds that function鈥攐ften highly
efficiently鈥攚ithout language and minds that have the qualitatively
different capacity for language. The minds of lions, and all other nonhuman
animals, are of the first kind, incapable of mastering language. This includes
those chimpanzees that have, as he puts it, been 鈥渢rained to within an inch of
their lives and bribed with M&Ms to master a few dozen learned associations
between symbols and things they want鈥�.
Furthermore, he argues that a widespread refusal to acknowledge that there
are different kinds of minds has led many people to what the late animal
behaviour researcher John S. Kennedy called compulsive anthropomorphism: the
overwhelming desire to see other animals as 鈥渓ike us鈥� or as slightly defective
versions of what we are. This, in turn, leads to an overinterpretation of what
we see animals doing. Horses that count, pigeons that form concepts and bees
that have maps in their heads have all been held up at one time or another as
examples of animals performing tasks in essentially human-like ways. All have
subsequently been shown to be cases where the animals had found their own, much
simpler ways of achieving the same results.
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Although a horse may not be able to add numbers or count up to ten, it is
undoubtedly highly remarkable that it notices subtle cues from its trainer and
gives the impression that it can. Rather than being disappointed that the horse
can鈥檛 鈥渞eally count鈥�, we should stand amazed at its ability to put two and two
together, so to speak.
Using Dennett鈥檚 phrase 鈥渦nthinking intelligence鈥�, Budiansky shows how innate
capacities, combined with an ability to form rapid associations between events,
can go a very long way towards mimicking tasks that we might accomplish by
reasoning. Some who train or observe primates get excited when they interpret
behaviour as 鈥渓ying鈥�: surely this means the primate has an idea about instilling
false ideas into others? 鈥淒eceit鈥� in general, however, does not have to involve
a theory of mind. It can be as simple as a flash of an eye spot on a butterfly鈥檚
wing.
Plants can 鈥渓ike鈥� shade without any sort of mind at all. Bacteria can steer
towards 鈥済oals鈥�. The problem is that words that we use initially as a short-hand
description of behaviour can end up seducing us into attributing motives and
foresight where none exist. Budiansky does an effective job of demolishing the
more extravagant claims that have been made for animal
intelligence鈥攕howing how building nests or using tools can result from
following very simple rules, for example.
So where does that leave consciousness? Would a talking lion be conscious?
More worryingly, are our present-day roaring versions not conscious through
having the wrong kind of mind? While Budiansky acknowledges that pre-linguistic
children are conscious, he nevertheless sees language and consciousness as all
but inseparable鈥攁nd as uniquely human. 鈥淐onsciousness is a wonderful gift
and a wonderful curse that, all the evidence suggests, is not in the realm of
the sentient experiences of other creatures鈥�.
The problem with this is that 鈥渢he evidence鈥� for simple mechanisms giving
rise to complex behaviour, which is admirably laid out in this book, is not the
same as 鈥渢he evidence鈥� (whatever that might be) for the evolution or
non-evolution of consciousness.