THE Bush administration is on the brink of demolishing another international
arms-control agreement. In Geneva this week, 50 nations are trying to
finalise a mechanism for policing the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons.
The US is widely thought to have decided to reject the protocol, which will
collapse without its support.
But surprisingly, some arms control experts who support a stronger bioweapons
treaty say this could be a good thing. They argue that the current proposal is
so weak that it could help rather than hinder would-be biowarriors. Others say
the proposal must succeed, because governments are unlikely ever to negotiate a
stronger one.
Negotiations on the protocol began in 1995, after the exposure of bioweapons
programmes in Iraq and Russia made it clear the Biological Weapons Convention
needed teeth. The compromise proposal on the table in Geneva this week calls on
countries to declare what biological defence facilities and high-containment
laboratories they possess, as well the agents they work with.
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A limited number of random inspections of these facilities would then be made
by a proposed Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, to check
the declarations. Stricter inspections could be made if a government suspects it
has been attacked, or that another country has bioweapons鈥攕o long as other
member states agree.
The US has been unenthusiastic about random visits ever since talks began
(New 杏吧原创, 28 February 1998, p 16).
Drugs companies say they could
endanger commercial secrets. The US delegation in Geneva this week has said only
that it is waiting for the Bush administration to decide its policy.
But arms-control experts say the Bush team has already decided to reject the
protocol. 鈥淭here are indications that it would prefer that the concept either be
radically reshaped, or simply allowed to wither away,鈥� writes James Leonard,
former US ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, in this month鈥檚
Arms Control Today. 鈥淭he new administration will almost certainly reject
the current proposal,鈥� says Alan Zelicoff of Sandia National Laboratories in New
Mexico, a US negotiator until 1999. 鈥淎nd the Senate is unlikely to approve it in
any case.鈥�
But they and others attribute this not to the current administration鈥檚
distaste for arms control, but to the proposal鈥檚 weakness. For example, states
bent on cheating could simply not declare labs, or they could grow pathogens in
breweries (which need not be declared) or antibiotics factories (which are
exempt from visits). Countries get two weeks鈥� warning of random inspections, can
limit what the visitors see, censor their report and ban biological
sampling.
Even following accusations of breaches of the treaty, the accused still gets
108 hours鈥� notice of an inspection鈥攎ore than enough to move or conceal
cultures and equipment. Countries can also deny access to facilities and
prohibit sampling.
In a report released in Geneva this week by the Stimson Center, an
arms-control think tank in Washington DC, a panel of American scientists and
arms inspectors conclude that more research into how to carry out inspections is
needed. In a test organised by the Stimson Center last July, two prominent
infectious-disease experts, both veterans of bioweapons inspections in Iraq and
Russia, visited a high-containment laboratory in New York state. The centre had
secretly planted fake anthrax cultures and records, and told the chief
technician to 鈥渁ct nervous鈥�. The team missed the 鈥渁nthrax鈥濃�攂ut did find
several spurious causes for concern.
Critics say this shows the proposed protocol could create unwarranted
suspicion instead of greater trust鈥攁lienating participants while failing
to catch culprits. 鈥淎n impotent monitoring protocol will implode sooner or
later,鈥� the Stimson report concludes, which means the bioweapons treaty could be
鈥渧iolated at will and possibly with impunity鈥�.
The question is what will happen if, as seems likely, the US rejects the
current proposal. Developing countries and Russia will not sign unless the US
does. Europe, which supports the protocol, could try to prolong the current
negotiations while trying to bring the US back in. But the US could instead seek
to have the talks restarted from scratch, in an attempt to get a different kind
of protocol.
Oliver Meier of Vertic, a think tank in London, says that would be the worst
outcome. 鈥淭he current proposal is weak, but if it is made flexible enough, it
can evolve. In the current political climate we are unlikely to get a mandate to
discuss a stronger agreement. And we can鈥檛 wait another six years.鈥�
The agonising choice now is between a treaty that will do little to stop
biowarriors, or nothing at all.