杏吧原创

FEAR of a chemical or biological attack has sparked panic buying of gas masks
since 11 September. The scare was worsened by news that operating manuals for
crop dusting aircraft had been found among the hijackers鈥� belongings, plus
reports that several of them tried to get hold of crop dusters.

The US considered the threat real enough to ground crop dusters for several
days. Then came claims that the US had satellite images of dead dogs tied to
stakes at an Osama bin Laden stronghold in Afghanistan鈥攑ossibly victims of
chemical or biological warfare (CBW) tests.

Rushing out to get a gas mask is probably a waste of your money.
And there are reasons to question some of the reports. Nevertheless,
some sources contacted by New 杏吧原创 believe that the terrorists
could have the means to launch a chemical attack.

The issue of how terrorists will strike next is vital not just in preparing
for the next attack, but in the longer term, as massive defence, intelligence
and R&D budgets are directed towards dealing with terrorism. The US has
already diverted $400 million from missile defence to counter-terrorism,
and much more funding is likely to follow.

Should large portions of it be focused, as nearly a third of US
counter-terrorism funding now is, on the CBW threat? Should Europe start
spending more? The authorities certainly appear to be taking the CBW threat
seriously, with warnings coming from people with the highest access to
intelligence, such as Prime Minister Tony Blair and US Attorney General John
Ashcroft. But those informing them may have interests of their own.

For starters, there鈥檚 the spectacular failure of Western intelligence
agencies to see the attacks coming鈥攑artly, some experts say, because of
the near-universal expectation in US government circles that any serious
terrorist attack would involve weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical
or biological weapons. That blinded security agencies to the real threat, some
experts feel. Those who warned of CBW terrorism in the past may want to continue
to emphasise the threat rather than admit they got it wrong. There鈥檚 a lot of
money at stake too. Those receiving funding to counter the CBW threat don鈥檛 want
their budgets cut.

Nor can one rule out the possibility that some reports are propaganda
intended to drum up support for military action or changes in civil security
measures. After all, while several groups have acquired noxious microbes or
chemicals, says Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center, a private think tank in
Washington DC, they鈥檝e made little use of them. She attributes this to the
substantial technical difficulties in using such agents.

It鈥檚 not easy even with a crop duster. Ron Manley, head of verification at
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, notes
that crop dusters spray fields at low levels. At higher altitudes, he says, most
material would evaporate before it reached the ground. 鈥淚t may kill a couple of
people, but not thousands.鈥� Such difficulties, he says, were why the US and the
Soviet Union had to work so hard to develop airborne sprayers for chemical
agents.

But while such attacks might be difficult, they鈥檙e not impossible. Some
experts, including former UN inspectors in Iraq, say a crop duster could be
deadly if the wind is right and the agent is not too volatile. What鈥檚 more, if
the attack created blind panic鈥攕ay in a stadium or city centre鈥攖he
terrorists might not need to kill very many people directly to produce mass
casualties.

What chemical would a terrorist with a crop duster use? Highly toxic
pesticides such as parathion are legally available, though laws limiting the
amount you can buy might make it hard to stockpile large quantities in countries
such as the US. Then there are other highly toxic chemicals used in
manufacturing, or generated as wastes. Plotters involved in last month鈥檚 attacks
are said to have tried to get licences to drive the tankers that carry such
substances.

But classic chemical weapons may also be available. Mustard gas and the nerve
agent VX are prime candidates for airborne spraying. Bin Laden鈥檚 network is
reported to be working closely with Iraq, which has experience in spraying
chemical agents from aircraft. In the 1980s, the Iraqi military attacked Kurdish
villages in the north of the country with mustard gas and VX.

Iraq鈥檚 chemical weapons programme was supposed to have been shut down after
the Gulf War. But in February 1998, Yossef Bodansky, chair of the US House of
Representatives鈥� Task Force on Terrorism, reported that Iraq had moved
stockpiles of mustard gas to Sudan immediately after the Gulf War. In 1996, it
built two factories to make agents such as VX in Sudan. Southwest of Khartoum,
said Bodansky, was a 鈥渃entre for the development of chemical weapons for use by
Islamist terrorists, mainly those affiliated with Osama bin Laden鈥�.

After the bombings of US embassies in Africa in August 1998, the US destroyed
a chemical factory near Khartoum connected with bin Laden. The US has never
produced evidence that proves the plant really was making chemical weapons. But
if Bodansky is right, there could still be chemical weapons in Sudan.

If so, the question is how, and where, the terrorists are prepared to use
them.