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ROGUE states apart, the chances of anyone turning to germ warfare are pretty
slim. That, at least, is the view of many defence experts, who reckon that bombs
are a more attractive option for terrorists. A bomb can hit a specific
target—human or otherwise, its impact is confined and it makes a lot of
noise, both literally and in the media. Bacteria and viruses cannot be so well
contained, and killing lots of defenceless people is unlikely to attract
sympathisers to the cause.

And while there would be no problem these days finding people and equipment
for handle microorganisms, there’s still a huge practical problem for would-be
bioterrorists: how to distribute the microbes. Some experts argue that
terrorists would find this impossibly difficult.

If such reassurances have calmed your fears, think again. The Aum Shinrikyo’s
1996 nerve gas attack in Tokyo introduced a new breed of terror group. Rather
than wanting to wield power in the political system, the sect wanted to destroy
the system totally: it wasn’t interested in public support.

This week, we learn that the Aum cult also managed to pump anthrax spores
into the Tokyo air
(see p 6). They didn’t use a lethal strain—but if they
had, people would have died. The sect may have chosen the wrong strain or may
simply have been testing its spraying method. Either way, distributing microbes
is clearly not as hard as some have claimed. We need to think again about the
threat of bioterrorism.