I of the Vortex: From neurons to self by Rodolfo Llin谩s, MIT Press,
拢16.95, ISBN 0262122332
BRAINS. What are they for? Prediction, according to Rodolfo Llin谩s, is
鈥渢he ultimate function of the brain鈥�. An ability to predict dangerous events
obviously improves our chances of averting them. Prediction is also useful for
fine-tuning movements and saving energy. But when Llin谩s suggests that
predictive capacity is important to explain what he calls the 鈥渕indness state鈥�
as well as the self and consciousness, it鈥檚 hard to tell where he鈥檚 going.
Llin谩s is known as a leading experimental scientist who has made major
contributions to our understanding of the properties of nerve cells and how they
communicate within the brain. In this ambitious book he attempts to outline a
coherent view of brain function. He discusses all the 鈥渂ig鈥� problems, such as
the nature of the self and of consciousness.
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I of the Vortex is 鈥渁imed toward a general audience鈥�. Llin谩s
presents the simple ideas simply鈥攂ut rarely managed to explain to this
reviewer how they relate to the main argument. Introducing the basics of his
idea of prediction, for example, Llin谩s calls to mind a situation where
you found yourself blinking just before a bug landed in your eye. 鈥淵ou did not
see the bug . . . yet you anticipated the event and blinked appropriately to
ward off its entry into your eye.鈥� He tells us that the anticipatory blink can
be explained by 鈥渁 subconscious sensorimotor image that says close your eye, a
bug is coming鈥�.
Does this simply mean that stimuli associated with irritation of the eye,
through some unspecified mechanism, cause the eye to close? If so, it is trivial
and empty鈥攔ather like explaining how a drug induces sleepiness by invoking
its 鈥渄ormitive virtues鈥�. If the phrase 鈥渟ensorimotor image鈥� means something
more, which I think it does, it becomes more problematic.
As Llin谩s approaches his central problem he makes lofty declarations
such as 鈥渢he self is the centralisation of prediction鈥� and 鈥渢hat which we call
thinking is the evolutionary internalisation of movement鈥�. These sound exciting.
But Llin谩s does not follow them up with explanations of what the neurons
in the brain are up to when, for example, prediction occurs or is
centralised.
When the book does deal with neurons, a major theme is 鈥渙scillations鈥�.
Llin谩s has discovered that the excitabilities of neurons in some brain
structures oscillate in synchrony. Many neuroscientists believe that such
synchronised activity in sets of nerve cells is the mechanism that connects or
鈥渂inds鈥� different sensory inputs into a coherent experience. Llin谩s
endorses this view鈥攁nd he also believes that oscillations underlie
subjectivity, the self, consciousness and the discontinuous nature of voluntary
movements.
Exactly how oscillations do these things never becomes clear. As soon as
Llin谩s discusses concrete mechanisms, the argument becomes problematic.
In fact, other investigators have contradicted some of his claims about stably
synchronised oscillations.
This is a book for those who like a lot of sound and fury but care less what
it signifies.