杏吧原创

AMERICANS face the demoralising possibility that the anthrax attacks are the
work of home-grown fanatics who鈥檝e never been near an Iraqi or Taliban terrorist
training camp
(see 鈥淭he secret is out鈥�).
If that is confirmed, it will reinforce the uncomfortable lesson
that bioterrorism is neither a purely theoretical risk nor the preserve of
foreign extremists. The US government will be keener than ever to take fresh
steps to counter it. But what steps? Already in its sights are the world鈥檚 鈥済erm
banks鈥�, the 1500-plus repositories of bacteria and viruses that supply
researchers with the samples they need. At talks in New York this week, the US
will press its allies for strict limits on what these banks can sell and to
whom. Yet at the same talks it is likely once again to reject the introduction
of international laboratory inspections and a regime of official openness about
research into biological agents that might be turned into weapons. The world鈥檚
first victim of an effective anthrax attack looks set to block the very measures
that would give teeth to the 1972 treaty banning bioweapons.

What鈥檚 going on? For years the official line from the US was that
international inspectors would fail to catch cheating nations, while
jeopardising the commercial secrets of law-abiding ones. We now know that the
real reason for opposing inspections was that the US was conducting secret
experiments to find out whether terrorists could produce and deliver various
pathogens. It was valuable research. Yet signing up to inspections would have
meant the US having to declare the project, possibly providing terrorists with
valuable information.

What鈥檚 needed is an agreement that permits such research while still
providing some global means of watching for bioweapons activity. This would
probably not have stopped the anthrax attack in the US. But it would open the
way to global cooperation in tracking the perpetrators, set a clear standard of
behaviour for states to follow, and make life harder for would-be bioterrorists.