WESTERN democracies are founded on a complicated network of compromises, the
best known of which stems from the conflict between the needs of the state and
the rights of the individual. Without compromise on one side the result is
totalitarian government; on the other it鈥檚 anarchy. In Britain, another of these
balancing acts is about to be upset. The government is pushing through powers to
control the flow of technical information that could benefit terrorists or
hostile states. In doing so it could seriously damage British science by
preventing鈥攐r at least putting bureaucratic obstacles in the way
of鈥攑eer review, publication and collaboration over research projects
(see 鈥淕agging order鈥�).
The Export Control Bill is aimed mainly at regulating the spread of military
technology. But in the worst British tradition of 鈥渂an everything now and
rethink it later鈥�, the bill imposes controls not only over hardware, but also
over related software and any other relevant information, including e-mails,
faxes and even casual conversation. This might not be so bad if the government
had decided exactly which technologies these measures will apply to. But it
丑补蝉苍鈥檛.
Universities and companies already need government approval to buy some
high-tech equipment, such as the ion-beam machines used to etch silicon chips.
The fear among researchers is that in the post 11 September world, controls will
be imposed on everything from air navigation systems to equipment used to
culture bacteria. Worse, researchers could need ministerial approval before
discussing any of these items with colleagues abroad or publishing papers that
relate to them. The new law will also give ministers the power to force
universities to submit foreign students for vetting by the security services.
So, students and researchers had better beware: if their foreign colleagues are
not properly licensed, those wide-ranging coffee-break discussions about nuclear
physics or biochemistry will have to stop.
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Many of these powers are ludicrous and unworkable, and ministers say they
will relax restrictions on academics after the bill becomes law. But why wait
till then? For a government that once professed freedom of information as a
guiding principle, this is a peculiar way to behave.
In the US things are little better. The government there is withdrawing
thousands of technical papers that amount to cookbooks for chemical and
biological weapons. It has also asked journal editors to leave out details from
papers that would be essential for anyone replicating the work. This undermines
the whole notion of ensuring that research results can be checked by others. It
also raises a paradox: terrorists, it seems, are deemed smart enough to
understand arcane science, but too dumb to fill in the gaps in research
papers.
What鈥檚 missing from these approaches is the voice of scientists. No one will
deny the need to stop information getting into the wrong hands, but any solution
will need compromise on both sides. That requires debate. But in Britain, at
least, the government is imposing鈥攏ot discussing.
