杏吧原创

IT鈥橲 A clumsy word that might better have been left in the dry pages of a World Bank report. Even worse, it can mean totally different things. But we鈥檙e stuck with 鈥済lobalisation鈥�. It does not begin to do justice to the richness and complexity of the changes that are happening as the world grows more interdependent and more connected, but around this one word has developed the first great debate of the 21st century. It is a debate that keeps world leaders locked up in their luxury conference suites with the windows closed, afraid that the breeze will bring them the roars of protesters and the smell of the tear gas. And if Bill Clinton is right, the effects of globalisation were brought home to New York, too, when the towers of the World Trade Center became the target for terrorist hatred.

Globalisation is the result of unprecedented scientific and technological advances. Microchips, jet planes, satellites and optical fibres are among the key inventions that have made a fast-moving, interlinked world possible. Over the past decade the costs of computing, telecommunications and transport have plummeted. Combining these technological changes with the opening of markets to the free passage of goods and finance has led to a huge boom in world trade, rapid economic growth with all its fearsome consequences for the environment, high-speed global financial markets and the dominance of a Western culture based on consumerism and individualism.

Now the world faces a big question. Is the type of globalisation which links the power of science and technology to a free market ideology going to make the whole world wealthier and more peaceful? Or, as the protesters fear, will it bring riches mainly to the few, new clashes between haves and have-nots, development that places an unsustainable strain on the environment, and rage at the aggressive promotion of Western values? If they are right, is reform or radical change necessary to harness science and technology to a kindlier form of globalisation.

If you believe the free-market fundamentalists then the protesters fears are wholly misguided. By the standard economic measures, the world is incomparably wealthier than ever before. Let global trade and investment expand, and more and more people will share in the fruits of a booming world economy. Economic interdependence will in turn usher in global peace.

For market economists it鈥檚 that simple: get out of the way of big business and the free movements of trade and capital, and every nation will be able to do what it does best. If labour is cheaper in one nation, companies will invest there to take advantage of it. Living standards there will grow, and development will spread, all driven by the invisible hand of the market.

The problem with this view is that so far the free market has delivered on only part of its promise.

Winners and losers

The world certainly is growing richer on average, and there is much to boast about. People on the whole are living longer, are better educated and are richer than they were 30 years ago. Since 1970, for example, the global infant mortality rate has dropped from 10 per cent to 5 per cent.

But new inequalities and instabilities are growing at the same time. 鈥淔ree trade鈥�, in the style which the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been designed to support, is benefiting some far more than others. Many nations are simply being left out as bystanders to the growth of global wealth.

A United Nations Human Development Report summed up the situation neatly in a much quoted paragraph: 鈥淭he greatest benefits of globalisation have been garnered by a fortunate few. A rising tide of wealth is supposed to lift all boats, but some are more seaworthy than others. The yachts and ocean liners are rising in response to new opportunities, but many rafts and rowboats are taking on water鈥攁nd some are sinking.鈥�

For the rich countries in their ocean liners there seem to be few worries. They simply go on getting richer. Meanwhile, the income gap between the rich and the poor grows greater. The graph at the bottom of this page shows the world income distribution in 1988 and 1993, recently calculated by Branko Milanovic of the World Bank. The lucky few in the developed nations are outriders on the far right of the curve; the majority are found in the huge hump to the left. Over the years the curve appears to have sharpened, leading Milanovic to conclude that world inequality has increased.

The flow of investment that should lift all boats was also anything but global. In 1997, for example, 10 countries took three-quarters of the world鈥檚 foreign investment. China, took a quarter. The poorest countries received little.

Some countries鈥� economies are clearly growing, but others are shrinking. In the period 1990 to 1999, 10 countries saw their economies contract by more than 5 per cent a year. Only 6 grew by more than 5 per cent a year. East Asia gained much, South Asia a little, America and the Middle East scarcely changed and sub-Saharan Africa sank. As the head of the United Nations Development Programme Report warned: 鈥淚f present trends continue, economic disparities between industrial and developing nations will move from inequitable to inhuman.鈥�

There are deepening disparities within nations, too. In the US, ironically the country that most vigorously supports market liberalisation, there has been a huge growth in inequality. Over the past two decades, following 60 years of moving towards a more equal society, the trend has been thrown into reverse. Close to 40 per cent of the national wealth is now owned by the top 1 per cent of households, very close to where it was in the 1920s, after having fallen to a far more equitable 20 per cent in the 1970s. This extraordinary growth in inequality has been matched only by the explosion in the prison population. In Britain, progress towards a more equal society also halted in the 1970s, and the incarceration rate in Britain is far higher than in any other European Union country, having increased by nearly a third between 1992 and 1995.

None of these figures will surprise the more radical opponents of the current style of globalisation, who see the root cause of growing inequality as the alliance between politicians and big business. New technology and, to a lesser extent, the movement of the least skilled jobs elsewhere, mean that there is little left for the unskilled in the developed nations. 鈥淚n this new competitive world of free market capitalism it is the unskilled that fare worst. They have become the Epsilons of our new Brave New World鈥攅ffectively commodities, easily replaceable by an ever growing overseas supply; and in our post-manufacturing era, in ever less demand,鈥� writes Noreena Hertz in The Silent Takeover, her best-selling attack on globalisation.

The freeing of global trade and finance has had other unexpected consequences. Consider the unbelievable volume of global financial flows every day, the computerised trading systems that can trigger instantaneous reactions to market change, and the stupendous sums of money that can be made (and lost) in financial trades, and it鈥檚 no surprise that upheavals in the financial markets can throw whole regions of the world into chaos. In 1998, when the Asian miracle economies finally crashed, the value of East Asian stock markets fell by $2 trillion. As their economies ground to a halt so did their demand for raw materials, triggering he collapse of the rouble in oil-exporting Russia. Years of growth were wiped out overnight and millions of people were thrown out of work. Political unrest and poverty followed.

Who or what was responsible for all these ruined lives? Western financiers blamed corrupt politicians and the poor practices of Asian banks. Asian politicians blamed greedy speculators. Everyone blamed a world financial system that lacks the regulations to keep up with the frantic mobility of global capital. But the world is no better prepared for the next meltdown than it was for the last.

Who is in charge?

The crisis of 1998 showed how powerless the governments of small nations are to withstand financial assault. Yet bigger nations may do little better. In 1992, Britain lost its fight to keep the pound in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism when financial markets moved against it. In the process, financial speculator George Soros made himself a billion dollars.

Opponents of globalisation see the overwhelming power of the financial markets as one threat to the ability of governments to run their nations according to the wishes of the electorate. Another is the sheer size of big corporations. As critics love to point out, 51 of the 100 biggest economies in the world are now transnational corporations and only 49 are nation states. General Motors鈥� annual sales amount to more than the GNP of Thailand or Norway, Ford鈥檚 add up to more than the GNP of Poland. Walmart stores have a turnover that outstrips the GNPs of Saudi Arabia, Greece, Portugal, Venezuela and the Philippines. Although sales and GNP are far from identical measures, and nations and corporations are too different to compare simply, the figures illustrate the giant economic clout of big companies.

The fear that nations are giving up their powers to big business is reinforced by the ease with which they can move around the world. Governments have to compete with one another to offer businesses the most attractive homes鈥攑referably free of tax and regulations on labour and the environment. In the eyes of the global economy鈥檚 critics, the shift of power from government to business explains the worldwide decline in the turnout at elections, and the growth in protest movements.

Goading the poor

鈥淭he punishment of Tantalus is the fate that torments the poor. Condemned to hunger and thirst, they are condemned as well to contemplate the delights dangled before them by advertising. As they crane their necks and reach out, these marvels are snatched away. And if they manage to catch one and hold on tight, they end up in jail.鈥濃�擡duardo Galeano, Upside Down

The world has never seen anything like it. Even when the British Empire ruled half the globe, it could never reach into the recesses of its subjects鈥� minds as Hollywood and Madison Avenue now can. The same films, the same music, the same television programmes, the same brands, and the same seductive style of living reach every last corner of the world. Even the same Western-centred television news is everywhere鈥攐r almost everywhere (see 鈥淭he world according to al-Jazeera鈥�). With the exception of India, no nation has a film or television industry that can outcompete the wonders of Hollywood. Entertainment is now one of America鈥檚 single biggest exports. Its offerings speak in a way we understand instinctively. As Galeano puts it, 鈥淭he consuming masses take orders in a language that is universal; advertising has achieved what Esperanto could not.鈥�

Is that universal language carrying a set of universal values we should all literally buy into? Many in the West might believe so. As Susan George has pointed out (see Globally local),the Western consumer lifestyle might almost constitute a religion, except for one cruel irony: entry into a church is free, but entry into a shopping mall is for those who can pay. More important for those seeking links between the events of 11 September and the ripping down of the world鈥檚 barriers is the way that consumerism may clash with traditional values. How do Britney Spears or the Spice Girls look in a traditional Muslim society? The combination of being left behind by development and modernity, and having the values of the winners rubbed in your face may be a particularly dangerous combination, stoking rage among the dispossessed and a simple desire to return to the fundamentals of your own culture.

Take Iran. The Shah, put into power by the CIA in the 1950s against the wishes of the people, tried to force rapid Westernisation. The response came in Ayatollah Khomeini, the ousting of the Shah in 1979, and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. One of the new regime鈥檚 first actions was to devise new school textbooks to counter 鈥淲estoxication鈥濃�攖he irrational fascination of ordinary people with everything Western at the expense of the indigenous cultural heritage鈥攁nd 鈥淓astoxication鈥�, the fascination of intellectuals with Marxism. 鈥淣either East nor West, Islam is best鈥� was the slogan of the 1980s.

America鈥檚 overwhelming military and economic dominance, the disappearance of alternative political ideologies with the death of communism and the inability of nations to shape their own destiny may create serious identity problems. Religious fundamentalism provides one solution to the crisis of identity and can fuel a deep resentment to the all-powerful America and the lifestyle it flaunts.

For the great majority of the developing world, and particularly for the Arab world, modern insult is added to past injury. Their development has always been perverted by outside interference, in the name either of colonialism or of anti-communism. Non-Western civilisations should be able to modernise while staying true to their traditions, to develop but remain themselves. Yet to date, the only one to have succeeded is Japan, a nation that was never colonised, retained a strong and separate culture for over 2000 years, and prioritised economic development immediately it was forced to open to the world. National identity, economic inequality, a sense of injustice and terrorism are surely intertwined.

Money mentality

There are plenty of ideas about how to make globalisation work better. Some might want to do away with it altogether and return to centrally-planned economies and tariff walls, but they would be in a very small minority since the collapse of Communism. Most of those fighting for change would want to harness the power of market forces to deliver a more equal world, and to make sure that no one is left out of modernity. Their ideas can be divided into three broad groups by where they would effect change: from the top down by reforming the current system, by changing the nature of money itself so it works toward a different set of values, and from the bottom up (and across) by building new forms of democracy and global citizenship.

Ideas for reforming the global system in the 21st century come from a wide range of people: ex-Presidents, financiers, Nobel prizewinners, scientists and economists. Many of these reforms may seem like common sense, but even the most modest adjustment will have to be fought for. Any change to the vast international financial system will be harmful to the interests of someone, somewhere who has the clout to fight back.

Many of the reformers would agree on important key issues. Trade rules enforced by the WTO are biased in favour of the rich industrialised countries and do less to open up markets for the agricultural products and textiles that poorer countries can produce more effectively. And while it and other bodies are effective at protecting trade, they are not complemented by bodies that deal as effectively with other global issues, from health and the environment to labour. While farmers in the rich countries are paid subsidies supporting practices that damage the environment, aid to the poorest countries has fallen dramatically now that there is no longer a need to prop up anti-communist governments.

Reformers call for action on all these points. 鈥淚t seems fundamental to me that that we cannot have a global trading system without a global economic policy, a global healthcare policy, a global education policy, a global environmental policy and a global security policy,鈥� says former President Bill Clinton, although one may ask why he did not say so louder when he was in office. Other reformers, like billionaire financier George Soros, call for transfer of wealth from rich to poor countries (see p 38), Nobel prizewinning economist James Tobin for taxes on financial speculation to reduce the volatility of markets, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto believes that widespread property rights will allow the poor to harness the power of the markets (see Land and freedom), and almost everyone has come to believe that 鈥済ood governance鈥� in Third World nations is essential if they are to develop.

The most sweeping views on how to change the world go back to the root of all our problems: money. Money seems such a natural thing that it is easy to forget that it is purely a human creation, and that the particular form of monetary system we have shapes all our actions. There are really only three ways to change someone鈥檚 behaviour: education and moral persuasion, rules and regulations, and financial interest. Financial interest will always be the most effective.

After the Second World War, John Maynard Keynes proposed a radical overhaul of money. He suggested that international trade be settled in a new 鈥渃urrency鈥�, and that holders of that currency would incur negative interest. That means the money earned by a successful exporting nation would always be diminishing in value, so it would naturally try to spend it as quickly as possible, and so boost the exports of other nations. Under this system, wealth and development is automatically shared between nations. Perhaps surprisingly, given Keynes鈥檚 tremendous standing, the plan was not supported. Instead, the poor nations borrow the rich nations鈥� money and pay them interest while trying to develop. It is a formula for the rich to grow richer.

Keynes鈥檚 idea has never entirely died, and today there are other monetary visionaries too. Bernard Lietaer was a senior executive of the Belgian central bank and was involved in the design of the ECU, forerunner to the euro. He claims in his new book, The Future of Money (Century, 2001), that if we could only understand the roots of money we would engender sustainable abundance for all 鈥渨ithin one generation鈥� (see 鈥淚t makes the world go round鈥�). Such radical ideas frighten most of the world鈥檚 politicians and bankers. For them only the most modest pace of reform seems worth contemplating.

But maybe the future doesn鈥檛 lie with big ideas, no matter how progressive their goals. Certainly, thousands of activists would agree that one simple phrase captures the best approach. The phrase is 鈥淣ot TINA but TATA鈥� and comes from Susan George (see Globally local). TINA was the acronym for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher鈥檚 favourite expression: 鈥淭here Is No Alternative鈥�. No alternative, that is, to the free-market, privatised, 鈥渢here is no such thing as society鈥� view of life with which she and US President Ronald Reagan transformed the 1980s. 鈥淭ATA鈥� stands for 鈥淭here Are Thousands of Alternatives鈥�. And thousands of alternatives, each suited to local needs, is what many of those who oppose corporate globalisation believe in.

Where to look for signs of 鈥渢housands of alternatives鈥�? They are everywhere. They are there among the poorest of the poor鈥攃reating, sharing and demystifying technology for those who may not even be able to read鈥攁s we鈥檒l explore in next week鈥檚 magazine. They are there among the communities in the industrialised world.

Two key indicators chart the changes. First is the staggering worldwide growth in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The second is the even more explosive rise in Internet use. The rise of the NGO is a reflection of the extraordinary way that citizens everywhere in the world are tackling issues themselves, and finding ways to put pressure on governments and businesses, rather than just expecting change through exercising their vote. Some, like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have grown into worldwide organisations with big budgets and public campaigns that can quickly force responses from business and government. Others work at the community level. All can exert additional influence by influencing how citizens spend their money. Experience shows, for example, that the quickest way to stop sports shoe manufacturers using cheap child labour is by refusing to buy their shoes, not by lobbying the WTO.

The growth of the Internet is helping power these grass roots organisations. The Web allows information to be shared, without central control, on a scale that could not remotely be envisaged if it had to be printed or broadcast. The technology on the Net is allowing a more complex and decentralised system to emerge, with more interactions between more players, a much greater flow of information and a far wider divergence of views.

Will new forms of democracy emerge from mass participation of people in local organisations, able to share their ideas and plan their campaigns globally? The answer is already a qualified yes, as few major meetings of international institutions鈥攚hether they deal with climate change or global trade鈥攏ow take place without NGOs also in attendance. Where this will lead is harder to say. The strength of the Internet is that it allows anyone to talk to anyone; its weakness is that it splinters and divides, allowing everyone to have a unique view. It鈥檚 not yet clear whether a host of local initiatives and the power of information technology will help create a new world order, or make us every more squabbling and divided.

Economics is not enough

This survey of globalisation has looked at some of the economic changes taking place in the world and their social impacts, and asked what kinds of reform might make globalisation work better for all. When the world is still reeling from the aftershocks of 11 September, it is right to ask how different events might be interrelated.

But this focus is still far too narrow to include many of globalisation鈥檚 effects. There is the huge growth in international crime, for example, with drug syndicates able to run billion-dollar international businesses that undermine democracy in poor nations and destroy lives everywhere. There鈥檚 the rapid spread of diseases like AIDS and drug-resistant tuberculosis. And there鈥檚 everything that goes beyond what economics and its narrow range of measures can record.

The huge change in the position of women will surely have profound effects. Where wealth is growing, gender inequalities are shrinking fast and more women are gaining positions of power. Women are at the forefront of many NGOs, particularly in the developing world, as we will see in next week鈥檚 issue. In traditional cultures these are changes that are wrenching and can provoke a violent backlash. For the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, rejecting westernisation also meant robbing women of their rights.

Then there is the impact of rapid economic growth on the global environment. As the failure of the international talks on climate change demonstrate, we are still far from being able to take effective action to protect the global commons. Already we are putting too much pressure on ecosystems. As James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank puts it: 鈥淲e do not have much time. In 25 years 2 billion more people will join our planet. The challenge will be greater, the pressure on resources will be more acute, the chances of success may be slimmer.鈥�

However skilfully the global economy is directed and reformed, whether through existing structures or new ones, one thing will not change: politics and economics cannot solve the world鈥檚 problems with today鈥檚 technology. Even if the rich countries do act (and they haven鈥檛 yet) on recent pledges to enormously boost foreign aid and provide the $40 to 60 billion a year needed for the UN鈥檚 鈥渕illennium development goals鈥�, providing food, clean water and primary education for all, real prosperity for everyone is not feasible with our current range of technologies and our current understanding of what people need.

We are going to need new sources of energy, new ways to farm, new forms of transport and new ways to live for everyone to enjoy prosperity. And that prosperity will take a new form that we can鈥檛 yet fully imagine. Science and technology launched the global, interconnected world. Now its task is to provide the solutions that will truly make it work for all.