THE prospect of the proliferation of bioweapons is so serious that the International Committee of the Red Cross is this week calling on governments and scientists to clamp down on work that could lead to weapons. The appeal is timely, as only this month a lethal pig bacterium unintentionally created by researchers was stolen from a university lab in the US.
The creation of the genetically modified bacterium and its theft show just how easy it is to get hold of dangerous pathogens. The US is already bringing in tough controls on work with potentially dangerous diseases. But even if these rules had already been in force, they wouldn鈥檛 have stopped the lab creating the bacterium or the thief from stealing it.
鈥淭he chances of a catastrophe will only be reduced to a minimum by a whole series of measures,鈥� Robin Coupland of the ICRC told New 杏吧原创 earlier this month. The ICRC, the world鈥檚 biggest humanitarian organisation for victims of conflicts, is calling on governments to implement 鈥渆ffective controls鈥� on potentially dangerous research and for scientists and companies to control access to dangerous microbes and knowledge.
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It is especially concerned by the threat of genetically engineered bioweapons, which has been largely ignored till now. 鈥淲e urge you to consider the threshold at which we all stand, and to remember our common humanity,鈥� the ICRC says. It hopes its appeal will have the same impact as the Red Cross鈥檚 1918 plea against poison gases, and its more recent landmine campaign.
The appeal is timed to come out ahead of the November meeting of signatories of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The treaty outlaws bioweapons but does not include measures to enforce this ban. At the last meeting, in 2001, the US vetoed a previously negotiated set of enforcement measures and proposed its own, cut-down measures. It is threatening to disrupt the November meeting if other countries attempt to revive the previous deal.
The US is now enacting some of these cut-down measures under the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, passed in the wake of last year鈥檚 anthrax attacks. By 10 September 2002, any US lab working with any microbes on a list of 鈥渟elect鈥� human pathogens was supposed to have registered with the federal government. By 10 October, labs working with a list of animal and plant pathogens must have done the same.
But that might not be enough. Early on 13 September, someone stole research records and two vials of genetically modified bacteria from a lab at the veterinary school at Michigan State University. It was trying to develop a vaccine against Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae (APP), a common bacterial infection that causes pneumonia in pigs but kills only about 1 in 10 animals.
The plan was to create a harmless strain of APP by deleting genes critical to the disease process. But, unexpectedly, one modified strain was far more dangerous, causing lethal encephalitis and convulsions rather than just a respiratory infection.
The US Department of Agriculture immediately issued an alert about the theft and warned farmers to report unusual cases of APP or encephalitis. While APP responds to antibiotics, the officials fear the modified strain might not be diagnosed correctly because of the odd symptoms, with the result that pigs will not get the right treatment and the bacteria might spread.
This week, Michigan State reported the arrest of someone who worked in the same building, but did not officially have access to the 鈥渟ecure鈥� lab, where workers needed to swipe a smart card to get in. The university says it has evidence that the stolen germs were destroyed. 鈥淭his does not appear to have been terrorism,鈥� says Lonnie King, dean of the veterinary school.
Because APP is common, it is not on the list of dangerous pathogens that researchers must register with the government. So neither the lab nor the person who stole the bacteria would be subject to any controls, even under the US鈥檚 new rules. 鈥淭he lab is in a new building and is as secure as any like it in the country,鈥� King asserts. 鈥淲e need more biosecurity, but at the same time we must keep doing this kind of research.鈥�
Richard Ebright of Rutgers University in Connecticut suggests that the same controls that now apply to dangerous pathogens should also apply to some research with 鈥渟afe鈥� germs, such as work that could increase a pathogen鈥檚 virulence or extend its host range.
But given the rapid developments in this area, it seems unlikely that any set of rules could cover all possible means of creating or obtaining dangerous diseases. Hence the ICRC鈥檚 appeal for researchers to police themselves, by an effective regulation of programmes, facilities and pathogens, and by adopting codes of conduct designed to prevent the abuse of biological agents.