A YEAR after the appalling events of 11 September, the talk is of the apparently inexorable march by the US and Britain towards war with Iraq. The connections between these two things are many, but far from simple. There is no evidence that Iraq鈥檚 leader Saddam Hussein was closely involved with al-Qaida鈥檚 plot, nor is it clear that Iraq is about to launch a terror campaign against the West, with or without weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, George Bush and Tony Blair have decided that crunch time has come.
One thing we learned from 11 September is how terrifyingly vulnerable modern urban society is to determined aggression. For this reason alone, we should think very carefully before going to war again in the Middle East. Much of the anti-Western feeling in the Arab world, including al-Qaida鈥檚 fanatical hostility, stems from the West鈥檚 interference in the region鈥檚 politics. To intervene again without an international consensus would be madness: a sure way to encourage further acts of terror.
But put 11 September aside for a moment. Saddam certainly poses an intractable problem. It is overwhelmingly obvious that he wants weapons of mass destruction, and there is plenty of evidence that he already has a few, and will acquire more. We know he has no qualms about using them. If we leave the man alone, he will grow ever more dangerous. What do we do?
Advertisement
To start with, we can stop fretting over the 鈥渄ossiers鈥� of proof that Saddam has nasty weapons, which London and Washington keep promising us. Evidence uncovered by UN weapons inspectors before they pulled out in 1998 makes it virtually certain that Iraq is rearming now. They found massive hidden programmes for developing biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Saddam鈥檚 people obstructed the inspectors at every turn, and in some cases weapons development carried on while the inspectors were looking elsewhere.
Saddam was determined to get his weapons then. Why wouldn鈥檛 he be now? The choice of what to do about Iraq is not dependent on new evidence. One more satellite shot or suspicious equipment purchase might be nice to confirm our opinions, but it鈥檚 not going to change what we know already. The choice is political: do we stop him now by force, or continue to try and contain him without military action.
It makes sense to stop him now. Containment through sanctions merely slows Iraq鈥檚 rearmament, while the people of Iraq suffer as a result. More weapons in Iraq will mean more weapons throughout the region, and eventually their use 鈥� with unforeseeable consequences. Eventually an Iraq with weapons of mass destruction may revisit old atrocities, attacking Israel, Iran or even Kuwait, again drawing in the rest of the world.
Yet the strategy Bush and Blair are promoting 鈥� aggressive, unilateral 鈥渞egime change鈥� 鈥� increases the chances that Saddam will unleash the weapons he already has. It will certainly increase mistrust and hatred of the West.
Some arms experts suggest a third way. Saddam is a nasty customer, but the real problem is his weapons. We need a way for the world as a whole to say that if he doesn鈥檛 give them up he will be removed from power. In other words, disarm or else! Put another way, we need UN arms inspectors with clout.
That is where the West鈥檚 strategy fell down before. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the UN passed resolutions requiring Iraq to give up its weapons of mass destruction. But it failed to follow through on the 鈥渙r else鈥� part. When the inspectors really started finding things, Iraq stopped giving them the access they needed to find more. Instead of forcing the issue, the UN pulled the inspectors out and fell back on trade sanctions.
Now it is up to the UN, not individual countries, to prosecute its earlier resolutions. With UN support, we need to send the investigators in again to finish destroying Saddam鈥檚 arsenal. But this time they will have to be backed up by a multilateral UN force on Iraq鈥檚 borders, ready to act if the inspectors find their way barred. Such a strategy might still lead to war and Saddam鈥檚 removal, but the choice would be his. This strategy would gain wide backing from around the world. It would have international legitimacy and establish the principle that the world wants fewer weapons. It could deter or even prevent retaliation by Iraq or by terrorists.
If the Bush administration can overcome its antipathy to arms inspectors, this policy might just work. We had the right idea the first time round. We just have to follow through.