鈥淗OW would you like your research paper to be found in a cave in Afghanistan with yellow highlighted sections?鈥� That was the stark rhetorical question put by a security expert to leading life scientists last week at the US National Academy of Sciences.
The upper echelons of science haven鈥檛 had a debate quite like it since the 1970s. Then the issue was whether to halt recombinant DNA research involving microbes until more was known about the risks. Now it is whether basic scientists, especially biologists, should refrain from publishing findings that might help terrorists develop or deploy bioweapons.
There are no easy solutions (see 鈥淩ecipes for bio terror鈥�). Nobody wants to gift information to the Osama bin Ladens of the world. On the other hand, openness in science is an indisputably good thing, and heavy-handed assaults on academic freedom risk hampering the spread of knowledge needed to combat disease. How to balance these conflicting goals? The debate has yet to deliver a consensus. A few things, though, seem reasonably clear.
Advertisement
First, the notion that disciplines such as microbiology can continue with no extra constraints following 9/11 looks increasingly naive. It is true that those terrorists relied on box cutters, not molecular biology. True, too, that the subsequent anthrax attacks were comparatively low tech and that cutting-edge science had even less to do with the ricin-brewing suspects arrested in Britain. Recipes for extracting the poison from castor beans have been circulating for decades. But none of this means terrorists won鈥檛 one day turn to the tools of molecular biology and attempt to corrupt them to create havoc on a vast scale.
Bioterrorists may, for now, be more likely to use nasty natural pathogens than set up sophisticated labs to make deadlier ones, but that doesn鈥檛 let the research community off the hook. Future studies reporting, say, simpler ways to culture anthrax or Ebola or dengue virus could as easily help terrorists as help vaccine researchers. And the prospect of terrorists creating a genetically engineered superbug will not always seem far-fetched. Fifty years ago, when the structure of DNA was first discovered, isolating genes was beyond the reach of even the most sophisticated scientists; today, humble undergraduates can clone genes in an afternoon.
Some say it is not scientists鈥� job to worry about the wicked uses to which their discoveries might be put. But this is morally shallow. If it is acceptable to rejig grant proposals to compete for the vast funds that are available for developing tools to combat terrorism, as many researchers have done, it cannot be right to walk away when the issue is the unpalatable one of publishing constraints.
Nor is it right to depict such constraints as the serpent that will ruin paradise. Academic freedoms should never be given up lightly, but bioscience does not exist in an Eden-like state of caring, sharing innocence. Molecular biologists do not always publish information or share materials. Often they withhold them to stay ahead of rivals in the race for ultimate honours, or, increasingly, for commercial advantage. If secrecy is acceptable in the name of profit, why not for combating terrorism?
The most telling objection is a practical one: the sheer difficulty of defining what findings should be held back, as well as what 鈥渉eld back鈥� should mean. The types of discoveries that could give birth to bioweapons are hard to predict and may (like box cutters) have innocent applications as well as harmful ones. Some critics argue that research should be either classified and locked up, or unclassified and available to all. Creating a third category 鈥� sensitive but unclassified 鈥� is, they say, a messy recipe for confusion and ad hoc censorship. So it might be, if the category is too broadly defined. But which is worse: calling information sensitive and asking legitimate scientists to apply for a licence to see it, or stamping it classified and locking it up?
Who gets to decide any rules, and police them, is obviously crucial. The defence community lacks sufficient expertise. Governments, alas, cannot be trusted. Few, since 9/11, have excelled in striking a balance between liberties and security. Some already abuse export controls on 鈥渟ensitive鈥� technologies to stifle economic competition, and would no doubt do the same with publishing constraints. If scientists can鈥檛 take a few steps to police themselves, others will do it for them 鈥� and make a mess of it.