IT IS rare for the world to seem as divided as it is today. The question of what to do next about Iraq brought millions of people onto the streets last weekend in protest, and exposed raw political differences between 鈥淥ld Europe鈥� and the US. At the UN security council in New York, the US and Britain were stonewalled as they sought further backing to forcibly disarm Saddam Hussein.
While the world agonises, 100 weapons UNinspectors continue to search, sample and track anything in Iraq that might give them a better picture of that country鈥檚 weapons programmes. Their success or failure will decide whether diplomacy gives way to warfare. The problem is that countries disagree on what success and failure mean.
Security council resolution 1441, which sent the inspectors back to Iraq last November, is confusing on the issue. The inspectors鈥� goal 鈥� to achieve the full and verified disarmament of Iraq 鈥� is clear, but how they reach it is not. There seem to be two paths. The first is 鈥渄eclare and verify鈥�: Iraq willingly says what it has, inspectors confirm it and put proscribed weapons out of harm鈥檚 way.
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This is what the US and Britain wanted, and they wrote designed resolution 1441 not only to garner international support in their campaign against Saddam but also to give him a last chance to disarm voluntarily. As an extra incentive they added an 鈥渙r else鈥� clause, by stationing an army on his doorstep. Iraq鈥檚 intentions should be known within weeks, they reasoned. And they are. The chief weapons inspector Hans Blix made clear last week that Saddam鈥檚 officials are not playing ball, though he hopes they might.
Iraq has failed to produce good evidence for serious issues outstanding from 1998, when inspectors were last in Iraq. It cannot verify, for example, what happened to stocks of VX nerve agent and weaponised anthrax. Since early January, inspectors have added to this list by finding undeclared proscribed missiles, illegally imported rocket engines and casting chambers for missiles. These might not inspire the same dread as a barrel of VX, but they are unsettling indications of Iraq鈥檚 intentions. To the US and Britain, each of these cases puts Iraq in breach of resolution 1441, so it鈥檚 time to invoke the 鈥渙r else鈥� clause.
But the security council never expected declare and verify to be enough, which is why resolution 1441 gave the inspectors draconian powers of search and seizure. This second model of inspection is 鈥渉ide and seek鈥�: Iraq tries to hide its weapons and the inspectors look for them. This is what happened after the Gulf War, when, through detective work, forensic science and luck, inspectors destroyed much of Iraq鈥檚 armoury. Crucially, however, hide and seek could not disarm Iraq totally.
Hide and seek is bound to be a long-term affair. 鈥淢aybe it will take two years,鈥� says Rolf Ekeus, former head of the inspection team. The inspectors have not had nearly enough time to make significant progress with this method. They received their first helicopter only on 5 January, and flights by U-2 spy planes have only just started. A Russian Antonov aircraft that can 鈥渟ee in the dark鈥� has still to fly.
Although hide and seek is starting to pay dividends, it will never disarm Iraq. That鈥檚 not what it鈥檚 for. France argues that this process should be given more time in order to find incontrovertible evidence of weapons of mass destruction. The danger here 鈥� and the hope for Saddam 鈥� is that by stringing out the inspections, the world will lose interest as it did in 1998.
Ultimately, the difference between the two models of inspections boils down to timing. Despite all the name calling and angry exchanges between politicians, there is plenty that they all agree on. At the European Union summit this week, Germany and France signed up to the statement: 鈥淭he Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance.鈥� The language may be diplomatic, but it still says 鈥渄isarm or else鈥�.
The use of force is recognised by all sides as the final sanction. The only alternative 鈥� to back down and go away 鈥� would show other would-be weapons proliferators how to dodge international demands to disarm. We may yet be able to back the inspectors in Iraq with force short of all-out war, but the threat must stay. If the strategy works in Iraq, then next time, maybe inspectors will be enough.