杏吧原创

Behind the Great Firewall of China

With the "blogging" revolution well underway in China, its state censors seem stuck between a rock and a hard place

THE spirit of freedom created by the internet revolution of the mid-1990s was truly inspiring. Usenet newsgroups and the World Wide Web created wholly new forums in which people could express their views. Here was a place where ideas could be exchanged freely and cheaply around the globe.

Those pioneering day have gone, and with them some of the new-found freedoms. The late 1990s saw action by copyright holders, libel lawyers and even governments to place limits on just how much 鈥渇ree flow of information鈥 is acceptable. The web quickly became subject to many of the constraints that apply to information in the rest of society.

That 鈥渘ormalisation鈥 was most pronounced in China, where any notion of the free flow of information was anathema to the government. The communist party there relies on a kind of Orwellian newspeak to try to convince citizens that life in China could not be better. Any news or opinion to the contrary remains subject to manipulation or outright suppression. A desire to prevent people in China using the web to find out things for themselves led the government to make extraordinary efforts to control the internet. Those efforts look increasingly futile.

Eight years ago, New 杏吧原创 ran a feature that explored the idea of what would happen if a notional 鈥淲eb tsar鈥 were given the job of clamping down on porn and undesirable political views (16 March 1996, page 44). The tsar introduced measure after measure to stop the suspect information being disseminated, but each time the web鈥檚 flexibility, combined with programmers鈥 ingenuity, left loopholes ripe for exploitation. In the end, the only way to control the web was to destroy it.

The Chinese government has been learning this lesson the hard way. It has tried blocking websites and closing discussion groups, searching emails for keywords, forcing internet service providers and news aggregators to avoid controversial topics, locking up internet dissidents and closing down internet cafes. Yet new challenges still appear. The latest to hit China is blogging 鈥 ordinary people posting stories on their own web log or 鈥渂log鈥, and adding their comments or views. This has allowed contentious issues to stay in circulation long after they have been censored from larger websites, partly because there are too many blogs for the authorities to keep up with, and partly because bloggers quickly invent euphemisms for frowned-upon words (see 鈥淐hinese whispers鈥).

How much difference all this activity has made depends on who you ask. Many in China say the flow of information and freedom of expression is now greater than ever. People know how to avoid government sanctions, and information from banned websites leaks out. To them, 鈥渢he west鈥 is too hung up on the issue of state censorship. But that鈥檚 not how many exiled Chinese see it, not to mention organisations such as the CIA. They want nothing short of western-style freedom of speech, and continue to hatch plots to secure it.

In some of its actions, the Chinese government continues to be as secretive as ever. Last year, the authorities locked up at least a dozen people who wrote emails warning of the SARS outbreak while the government was hushing it up. But on another front, there are signs of change. Information technology is crucial to China鈥檚 economic growth. The country has its own nascent IT industry, and in recent years western firms have opened labs there (see 鈥淐rouching Bill, hidden talent鈥). To be successful, these enterprises will need open access to the web.

The government has a tough choice to make. Does it maintain its tight grip on information and stifle business, or relax its control and let commerce thrive? The idea that the Chinese authorities will suddenly see the light and adopt western-style freedom of speech is a naive hope. But Beijing鈥檚 economic ambitions may yet achieve what politics, idealism and diplomacy never will.