AL-QAIDA couldn鈥檛 have done more for microbiology if they had been hired as PR. Since 9/11, the US government鈥檚 spending on biodefence has rocketed, with the bulk of the money going into research on infectious diseases, immunology and virology. 鈥淲e鈥檝e been given a great positive boon,鈥� says Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). 鈥淓ven if we never, ever get attacked, the benefits to society will be enormous.鈥�
Since 2001, Fauci鈥檚 biodefence budget has grown a whopping 3000 per cent. Last autumn, the NIAID handed out eight regional grants totalling $350 million over 5 years (see map). NIAID also picked two sites for its new Biosafety Level 4 labs, which handle the most lethal biological agents. Then in February, President Bush unveiled Project Bioshield, which will pump an additional $5.6 billion into the field.
鈥淭he opportunities have never been greater,鈥� says Ruth Berkelman, a professor at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and chair of the American Society of Microbiology鈥檚 Public and Scientific Affairs Board. Opportunities are opening up, not only in basic research, but also on the more applied side, she says. The focus is now on developing 鈥渃ountermeasures鈥� 鈥� that is, new and better ways of protecting people, and diagnosis and treatment of those who might have come under biological attack.
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For many, this has demanded a major conceptual shift. Much of the finest academic research is simply about trying to answer interesting questions. But the new biodefence drive is forcing scientists to think explicitly about applications of their research, says Jennie Lovett of Washington University in St Louis, Missouri, one of the sites chosen for a regional grant. 鈥淭hey have to ask: 鈥榃hat can we make? Can we do it in five years? Two years?'鈥�
The regional 鈥渃entres of excellence鈥� are being funded to follow new avenues of research, such as discovering novel ways to block the action of botulinum and cholera toxins, or coming up with a vaccine against Ebola.
聯Being able to rule out things like influenza and SARS will make it much more likely that genuine attack is detected聰
The push towards developing products has meant that new alliances have been forged, according to Dennis Kasper, whose group at Harvard Medical School was also awarded a regional grant.
鈥淥ne area that I hope will get more attention will be developing diagnostics, which has not been on the front burner,鈥� says Berkelman. 鈥淚t鈥檚 only on a background of known diseases that we identify the new.鈥� Being able to rule out things like influenza and SARS will make it much more likely that a genuine attack is detected, she says.
The funding will allow researchers to study agents that have long been neglected, says David Walker, who heads the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, another regional grant recipient. 鈥淪o much effort has gone into strep and staph over and over again,鈥� he says. Now, he is hopeful that new antivirals might be developed. There are also groups interested in studying ways to bolster 鈥渋nnate immunity鈥� 鈥� the body鈥檚 general ability to fight off pathogens.
There are also important questions about existing vaccines and antivirals. Washington University in St Louis, for instance, is hoping to explore why some people experience serious side effects after smallpox vaccination. Lovett says they would like to develop a way to take people鈥檚 genetic fingerprints, which would make it possible to warn them beforehand if they are likely to have trouble and advise them on what to do.
The need for research in this area is acute. In 2000, the Defense Science Board, the federal body that advises the Secretary of Defense, identified 57 countermeasures as essential protection against bioterrorism 鈥� yet only two have been developed. Worse, the private sector has lost interest in vaccines and antivirals in recent years. The smallpox vaccine around today, for instance, is not much different from the one used in the 1960s. And vaccines simply haven鈥檛 been developed for many diseases. Pharmaceutical companies have even turned away from making the tried and tested vaccines used in routine childhood immunisation, and on occasion, supplies in the US have dropped so low that clinics have run out.
That is where Project BioShield comes in. One of its key aims is to entice companies back into the vaccine and therapeutics business. First, it sets aside an enormous sum of money to purchase and stockpile vaccines and other therapies once they have been developed. Secondly, it gives the National Institutes of Health the means to streamline its biodefence research by, for instance, speeding up the process of peer review and allowing more flexibility in awarding contracts. Finally, it gives new authority to the Food and Drug Administration to speed promising drugs through the licensing process in the event of an emergency.
So far, however, the response by the big hitters in the field has been chilly. 鈥淚t has not been embraced with the enthusiasm the administration had hoped for,鈥� says Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, a Washington DC-based think tank. Moodie says that questions about liability still plague the initiative. If a quickly licensed drug were to have adverse effects, a lawsuit could put a company out of business, he says. Nor have companies forgotten how the government pressured manufacturers of the antibiotic Cipro to cut prices during the 2001 anthrax scare and even threatened to suspend the patent if they refused.
In academia there are concerns about new security requirements. For instance, both individuals and facilities working with agents on the Centers for Disease Control list have to be registered. Some foreign scientists can no longer get visas, let alone clearance. And there are new rules about the transfer of agents between labs. Some think the requirements are over the top, says Moodie. But Berkelman downplays this problem: 鈥淓ven though there have been some issues, so far it has not happened that people are turning away.鈥�
Young scientists contemplating the field are also wary about the government鈥檚 commitment. Many are not convinced the cash will amount to more than a one-off injection, says Lovett. But she is confident that the field will be vibrant for some time. Walker, too, is hopeful: 鈥淲ill Congress understand? I think so.鈥� The fear 鈥� and risk 鈥� of biological attack, he says, is not going away any time soon.
Though the purpose of all this spending is in principle to protect against a biological attack, it is clear to all that there will be enormous collateral benefits. 鈥淚t will undoubtedly have very positive spin-offs for things that have nothing to do with biodefence,鈥� says Fauci.
The country will, for instance, gain two great new labs, as well as further expertise in understanding pathogens and applying the fields of genomics and proteomics, he says. Walker agrees. In studying agents that can be used as weapons, you are bound to find out more about related pathogens as well, he says. For instance, if an antiviral agent were to be developed against the highly infectious and readily aerosolised Venezuelan equine encephalitis (already made into a weapon by the US and the Soviet Union), that drug could probably also be used against eastern equine encephalitis as well.
Concentrating on ways to fight bioterror, such as BioShield鈥檚 fast-tracking procedure, could improve the country鈥檚 response to natural outbreaks too, says Fauci. And Samuel Miller at the University of Washington in Seattle wonders if this boost might change the way infectious disease research is done forever. Walker even goes so far as to cautiously compare the 鈥渟pillover鈥� impact of such work on the field as a whole to the effect NASA had on space research.
The contrast to the beginning of Walker鈥檚 career couldn鈥檛 be more stark. Just as he was starting out in the late 1960s, the US surgeon-general declared that the war on deadly diseases like smallpox, polio and rheumatic fever had been won, and that it was time to close the book on infectious diseases. That book has now been reopened.