IN THE aftermath of the anthrax letter attacks in the US in 2001, the White House championed a massive effort to create and stockpile drugs and vaccines against potential biological weapons. At the time, many infectious disease researchers voiced concerns that work intended to improve our basic understanding of pathogens would be curtailed in favour of research into countering relatively rare infections that could, nevertheless, be turned into bioweapons.
By 2003, their fears had dissipated as it became clear that the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) would be left in charge of dividing up research money. And the notion that basic science was needed to underpin applied research seemed to have been accepted.
Yet those old worries resurfaced this week with publication of a letter signed by 750 researchers funded by NIAID. They argue that the balance between bioweapons research and work of general significance to public health is all wrong. Underlying their argument is the feeling that trivial research on, say, anthrax wins funding, while basic research on E. coli that could be hugely important in all infections is being rejected (see 鈥淭he hidden cost of fighting bioterror鈥�). NIAID quickly countered that the signatories have their figures wrong and that funding for non-biodefence research has remained steady or risen.
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At this stage it is not clear who is right. One possible reason for the confusion is that the database which serves as a public record of funding is so complicated that even senior staff at NIAID admit they do not understand it. But this is a lame excuse. NIAID has some serious thinking to do about how it keeps people up to date with its actions and intentions.
This episode is likely to reopen debate over the best way to protect people from infectious diseases of any origin. At present, the US government is focusing big money to find countermeasures against a list of potential bioweapons, such as organisms that cause plague and tularemia. But what if an enemy tweaks one of these pathogens to make it immune to drugs and vaccines, or chooses an organism not on the list? And what if the next big outbreak comes from a natural source, such as bird flu or a recurrence of SARS, neither of which was on the radar in 2001?
Another approach would be to invest more in basic research. Thanks to advances in genomics, researchers are on the threshold of making great strides in understanding what makes bacteria and viruses tick, how to kill them and how to stop them infecting people. This basic knowledge can then be applied to other pathogens, however they emerge.
Ultimately, the best course probably lies somewhere between these extremes. Whether the row over NIAID鈥檚 priorities turns out to be a true revelation or storm in a teacup, it highlights the need for constant review of strategies for protecting the public.