FOR years the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been moribund. Under the 1968 agreement, states with nuclear weapons must disarm while nations without such weapons can only build civil nuclear reactors. But progress on disarmament has ground to a halt, and the treaty has failed to cope with countries that created nuclear arsenals after 1968, such as Israel, Pakistan and India, or with North Korea, which pulled out of the NPT in 2003.
This week鈥檚 accord between US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to begin trading in civil nuclear technology looks certain to shake the NPT and other nuclear control agreements to their roots (see 鈥淚ndian nuke deal鈥�). In all but name, Bush seems to want India to have the same status as a nuclear weapons state, even though Singh refuses to sign the NPT. This will create ripples in Israel and especially in Pakistan.
Most worryingly it could also encourage nations without nuclear weapons to think twice about membership. If a country can develop these weapons and still join the international fold, what鈥檚 the point of signing up? There is one potential upside. The accord could be the catalyst needed to revitalise the NPT, making it capable of dealing with the changing nuclear landscape, and of restarting disarmament. That would be a good thing.
Advertisement