AMID the fallout from North Korea鈥檚 nuclear test this week, voices of doom have been clearly heard predicting the end of the global non-proliferation approach to controlling nuclear weapons, which has sought to limit their spread since the days of the cold war. Should we listen to them? Are the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as good as obsolete?
The answer has to be no, simply because the alternative 鈥� a global arms race 鈥� is too appalling to contemplate. True, North Korea has demonstrated that the non-proliferation approach is not working (see 鈥淣uke test sends shock waves round world鈥�). But rather than abandoning it, the rest of the world should take a long hard look at why it isn鈥檛 working, and then correct it.
There is a central reason why non-proliferation is failing: it is not being applied fairly. Under the NPT, countries without nuclear weapons are only allowed to pursue civil nuclear programmes, while the 鈥渙fficial鈥� nuclear states must disarm. Yet they haven鈥檛 been disarming. The UK, for example, is thinking of updating its Trident deterrent.
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What鈥檚 more, the US has refused even to ratify the ban on nuclear testing. It is also planning a replacement for its nuclear missiles that it claims will not need testing 鈥� a claim experts dispute. Worse, when India and Pakistan tested their own nuclear weapons, they were practically welcomed into the nuclear club. Where is the incentive for a state like North Korea not to acquire a bomb?
It is time the nuclear states kept their side of the non-proliferation bargain, and started recognising that we are all in this together.
