NEARLY seven years after the anthrax attacks that killed five people, the US Department of Justice appears to believe we may soon have a satisfactory account of who committed them. The apparent suicide last week of Bruce Ivins, head of the programme to improve anthrax vaccine at the in Frederick, Maryland, has triggered speculation that he was about to be charged for the attacks (see 鈥淎nthrax genes point to perpetrator鈥�). It has also fostered accusations that by pouring money into biodefence research and giving more scientists access to hazardous materials, Washington has made the country more vulnerable rather than safer.
Biodefence research in the US has undoubtedly been boosted by the attacks. Since 2001, the federal government has spent some $50 billion on shoring up its biodefences. Some scientists have complained that this has diverted efforts from more important research. Commentators also argue that it has put the country more at risk by giving more people access to material that could be turned into a weapon. Already there have been calls to rein in research into pathogens such as anthrax 鈥� either by introducing draconian restrictions on those who carry out this work, or by banning it altogether.
Either option would be a mistake. The upsurge in funding for anthrax research in particular has been highly productive. It has made it possible to determine the genetic signatures of different strains, an that could lead investigators to the perpetrator of the 2001 attacks 鈥� or any future attacks. There are already tight restrictions on who is allowed to work with biological agents. Revised rules issued for army researchers last week bar anyone thought to be displaying 鈥渁rrogance, inflexibility, suspiciousness, hostility鈥� and extreme moods or mood swings鈥�. Even before that, the rules were onerous enough to discourage many researchers from doing this kind of work.
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One thing should change, however. Too much biodefence research is happening behind closed doors. Until the investigation into the anthrax attacks began, few people knew that the US had resumed making weaponised anthrax powder. Safety in biodefence labs is a top priority, and for this transparency is crucial. Many safety violations are still going unreported (see New 杏吧原创, 6 October 2007, p 24). Far better to ensure that safety rules are strictly followed and to encourage open, responsible research, than to succumb to a knee-jerk response and shut off research that is already bearing fruit.