Time and money pressures, along with management lapses, proved a fatal combination for the Beagle 2 spaceprobe that aimed to land on Mars, an official inquiry has concluded.
The British-built lander has been completely silent since it was released from its mothership, Mars Express, on 19 December 2003. On Monday, the British National Space Centre and the European Space Agency released a summary of 19 lessons learned from the failed mission. The complete report, which will not be made public, follows a three-month investigation by unnamed space experts from Europe, Russia, and NASA.
Ironically, Beagle 2鈥檚 ambitious scientific goals 鈥� to search directly for signs of Martian life 鈥� may have played a role in the mission鈥檚 undoing. The summary states: 鈥渢he very high potential scientific benefits of the project may have contributed to a collective institutional underestimate by us all of [how] to identify and mitigate the risks [resulting from] the very tight financial, mass and schedule constraints鈥�.
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The tight time constraint arose because Beagle 2 had to be ready to launch on Mars Express, which itself was assembled in record time to take advantage of the close approach between Mars and Earth in 2003.
Drip by drip
The mission eventually cost 拢50 million, but the funding initially came only in 鈥渄rips鈥� after work began in 1998, says Barrie Kirk, the mission鈥檚 former project manager at aerospace company Astrium. 鈥淭he full funding wasn鈥檛 completed until June 2001, which was 18 months to delivery,鈥� he told New 杏吧原创.
Mark Sims, mission manager at the University of Leicester, UK, agrees this was a key problem: 鈥淭he fact we didn鈥檛 have any money for two years clearly made it difficult.鈥� If it had been available sooner, he says, high-risk elements such as the craft鈥檚 airbags could have been tested earlier.
In the summer of 2001, the team discovered the probe鈥檚 airbags did not work. As a result, engineers had to scramble to redesign them, as well as designing and building a new parachute to ease the probe鈥檚 landing. That task was completed in just four months.
ESA鈥檚 science director David Southwood initially did not support the project when he took office in 2001. 鈥淏eagle 2 was a bridge too far in terms of radical constraints,鈥� he said. 鈥淚 always felt it was going to be a close-run thing.鈥�
The mission鈥檚 risks were a subject of a tense exchange at the press briefing. Southwood said future missions should be solely government-sponsored and criticised the fact that the Beagle 2 team had tried to get commercial sponsorship, saying that led to 鈥渁 tendency to overestimate success or underestimate risks鈥�.
But Beagle 2鈥檚 principle investigator Colin Pillinger, of the UK鈥檚 Open University, replied: 鈥淲e didn鈥檛 get sponsorship probably because we were too honest.鈥� He said he told potential investors the mission was a crash-and-burn project similar to Formula One motor racing.
Weighing the risk
鈥淲e convinced the team, the review panel, NASA, the European Space Agency, and the whole country that the rewards for Beagle 2 outweighed the risks,鈥� Pillinger said. He has also pointed out that two out of three of all Mars lander missions have failed.
Pillinger challenged ESA to launch a replacement for Beagle 2 as soon as possible. ESA will decide on future missions, which are likely to involve a lander on Mars, in 2005.
Ten of the recommendations, which have been accepted by all parties, relate to management issues. Southwood said future missions should clearly specify 鈥渨ho is giving orders鈥� and should allow 鈥渞obust margins to cope with inherent uncertainties鈥�.
The remaining recommendations demand specific technical improvements to future missions, each carrying an implicit criticism of the Beagle 2鈥檚 failings:
聲 鈥淎dequate and realistic鈥� deployment tests should be performed on Earth before launch
聲 Internal electrical connectors should not be eliminated to keep the craft鈥檚 weight low
聲 Spacecraft using pyrotechnic devices to separate components or involving impacts should be undergo 鈥渞epresentative shock testing鈥� as a whole
聲 Items that separate, such as spacecraft covers, must be designed to guarantee they do not subsequently collide with either the craft itself or its parachute
聲 US and Russian expertise should be used to design air bags and parachutes
聲 Mission managers should be able to directly send commands to the lander without reliance on software
聲 Telemetry should send 鈥渧ital signs鈥� from the probe during critical phases such as atmospheric entry and descent 鈥� NASA鈥檚 Mars rovers did exactly this
聲 A back-up system should detect when the probe has entered the atmosphere