杏吧原创

Driving into a conspiracy? (Image: REX/Courtesy Everett Collection)

To believe that the US government planned or deliberately allowed the 9/11 attacks, you鈥檇 have to posit that President Bush intentionally sacrificed 3,000 Americans. To believe that explosives, not planes, brought down the buildings, you鈥檇 have to imagine an operation large enough to plant the devices without anyone getting caught.

To insist that the truth remains hidden, you鈥檇 have to assume that everyone who has reviewed the attacks and the events leading up to them 鈥� the CIA, the Justice Department, the Federal Aviation Administration, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, scientific organisations, peer-reviewed journals, news organisations, the airlines, and local law enforcement agencies in three states 鈥� was incompetent, deceived or part of the cover-up.

And yet, as Slate鈥檚 Jeremy Stahl , millions of Americans hold these beliefs. In a taken six years ago, only 64 per cent of US adults agreed that the attacks 鈥渃aught US intelligence and military forces off guard鈥�. More than 30 per cent chose a different conclusion: that 鈥渃ertain elements in the US government knew the attacks were coming but consciously let them proceed for various political, military, and economic motives鈥�, or that these government elements 鈥渁ctively planned or assisted some aspects of the attacks鈥�.

How can this be? How can so many people, in the name of scepticism, promote so many absurdities?

The answer is that people who suspect conspiracies aren鈥檛 really sceptics. Like the rest of us, they鈥檙e selective doubters. They favour a world view, which they uncritically defend. But their worldview isn鈥檛 about God, values, freedom, or equality. It鈥檚 about the omnipotence of elites.

Conspiracy chatter was once dismissed as mental illness. But the prevalence of such belief, documented in , has forced scholars to . Conspiracy theory psychology is becoming an with a broader mission: to understand why so many people embrace this way of interpreting history. As you鈥檇 expect, distrust turns out to be an important factor. But it鈥檚 not the kind of distrust that cultivates critical thinking.

In 1999, a research team headed by Marina Abalakina-Paap, a psychologist at New Mexico State University, published a . The students were asked whether they agreed with statements such as 鈥淯nderground movements threaten the stability of American society鈥� and 鈥淧eople who see conspiracies behind everything are simply imagining things鈥�. The strongest predictor of general belief in conspiracies, the authors found, was .

But the that was used in the experiment to measure 鈥渢rust鈥� was more social than intellectual. It asked the students, in various ways, whether they believed that most human beings treat others generously, fairly and sincerely. It measured faith in people, not in propositions. 鈥淧eople low in trust of others are likely to believe that others are colluding against them,鈥� the authors proposed. This sort of distrust, in other words, favours a certain kind of belief. It makes you more susceptible, not less, to claims of conspiracy.

Once you buy into the first conspiracy theory, the next one seems that much more plausible.

A decade later, a study of British adults yielded similar results. Viren Swami of the University of Westminster, working with two colleagues, found that beliefs in a 9/11 conspiracy were associated with . He and his collaborators concluded that 鈥渃onspiracist ideas are predicted by an alienation from mainstream politics and a questioning of received truths鈥�. But the cynicism scale used in the experiment, drawn from a , featured propositions such as , and It didn鈥檛 measure general wariness. It measured negative beliefs about the establishment.

The common thread between distrust and cynicism, as defined in these experiments, is a perception of bad character. More broadly, it鈥檚 a tendency to focus on intention and agency, rather than randomness or causal complexity. In extreme form, it can become paranoia. In mild form, it鈥檚 a common weakness known as the 鈥� ascribing others鈥� behaviour to personality traits and objectives, forgetting the importance of situational factors and chance. Suspicion, imagination, and fantasy are closely related.

The more you see the world this way 鈥� full of malice and planning instead of circumstance and coincidence 鈥� the more likely you are to accept conspiracy theories of all kinds. Once you buy into the first theory, with its premises of coordination, efficacy, and secrecy, the next seems that much more plausible.

Many studies and surveys have documented this pattern. Several months ago, asked 1,200 registered US voters about . Fifty-one per cent said a ; only 25 per cent said Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Compared with respondents who said Oswald acted alone, those who believed in a larger conspiracy were more likely to embrace other conspiracy theories tested in the poll. They were twice as likely to say that a UFO had crashed in Roswell, New Mexico, in 1947 (32 to 16 per cent) and that the CIA had deliberately spread crack cocaine in US cities (22 to 9 per cent). Conversely, compared with respondents who didn鈥檛 believe in the Roswell incident, those who did were far more likely to say that a conspiracy had killed JFK (74 to 41 per cent), that the CIA had distributed crack (27 to 10 per cent), that the government 鈥渒nowingly allowed鈥� the 9/11 attacks (23 to 7 per cent), and that the government adds fluoride to our water for sinister reasons (23 to 2 per cent).

The appeal of these theories 鈥� the simplification of complex events to human agency and evil 鈥� overrides not just their cumulative implausibility (which, perversely, becomes cumulative plausibility as you buy into the premise) but also, in many cases, their incompatibility. Consider the in which Gallup asked 471 Americans about JFK鈥檚 death. Thirty-seven per cent said the Mafia was involved, 34 per cent said the CIA was involved, 18 per cent blamed vice-president Johnson, 15 per cent blamed the Soviets, and 15 percent blamed the Cubans. If you鈥檙e doing the maths, you鈥檝e figured out by now that many respondents named more than one culprit. In fact, 21 per cent blamed two conspiring groups or individuals, and 12 per cent blamed three. The CIA, the Mafia, the Cubans 鈥� somehow, they were all in on the plot.

Two years ago, psychologists at the University of Kent led by Michael Wood (who at a delightful ), escalated the challenge. They offered UK college students : four in which she was deliberately killed, and one in which she faked her death. In a second experiment, they brought up two more theories: that Osama Bin Laden was still alive (contrary to reports of his death in a US raid earlier that year) and that, alternatively, he was already dead before the raid. , 鈥淭he more participants believed that Princess Diana faked her own death, the more they believed that she was murdered鈥�. And 鈥渢he more participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when US special forces raided his compound in Pakistan, the more they believed he is still alive鈥�.

Another research group, led by Swami, fabricated conspiracy theories about Red Bull, the energy drink, and showed them to 281 Austrian and German adults. One statement said that a 23-year-old man had died of cerebral haemorrhage caused by the product. Another said the drink鈥檚 inventor 鈥減ays 10 million euros each year to keep food controllers quiet鈥�. A third claimed, 鈥淭he extract 鈥榯esticulus taurus鈥� found in Red Bull has unknown side effects.鈥� Participants were asked to quantify their level of agreement with each theory, ranging from 1 (completely false) to 9 (completely true). The average score across all the theories was 3.5 among men and 3.9 among women. According to the authors, 鈥渢he strongest predictor of belief in the entirely fictitious conspiracy theory was belief in other real-world conspiracy theories鈥�.

Clearly, susceptibility to conspiracy theories isn鈥檛 a matter of objectively evaluating evidence. It鈥檚 more about alienation. People who fall for such theories don鈥檛 trust the government or the media. They aim their scrutiny at the official narrative, not at the alternative explanations. In this respect, they鈥檙e not so different from the rest of us. Psychologists and political scientists have that . Scholars call this pervasive tendency 鈥渕otivated scepticism鈥�.

Conspiracy believers are the ultimate motivated sceptics. Their curse is that they apply this selective scrutiny not to the left or right, but to the mainstream. They tell themselves that they鈥檙e the ones who see the lies, and the rest of us are sheep. But believing that everybody鈥檚 lying is just another kind of gullibility.

This article originally appeared in .