ADVICE to the UK鈥檚 foreign secretary David Miliband was clear. For 48 hours, memos flew from his officials, all advising him to hold back, take his time, consult and consider alternatives.
He ignored them. The next day, five weeks before the 2010 election that would remove him from office, Miliband set up a giant marine protected area (MPA) covering 640,000 square kilometres of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), an area roughly the size of France. It meant a ban on fishing around the tiny islands of the Chagos archipelago, a leftover from the British Empire. Only Diego Garcia, an atoll with a massive US military base, was excepted.
While the MPA suited the US, it angered former Chagossians, who 40 years before had been shipped to Mauritius and Seychelles to make way for the US. They say the ban is meant to stymie demands to return to some islands and set up fishing businesses. They could be right. Certainly, it lacks scientific credibility and diplomatic integrity.
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Miliband鈥檚 rushed decision was always curious. And now the plot thickens. Official memos released to a judicial review of the MPA to appear in , in a paper by Richard Dunne, British barrister and coral reef scientist, show that Miliband snubbed his civil servants and fisheries advisors, who said the scientific case for the MPA did not stack up.
Miliband is not saying why. He did not respond to requests for a comment. Was it crude geopolitics 鈥� a 鈥渂lue grab鈥� of strategically valuable ocean? Or was it environmental zeal from a man who later became co-chair of the ?
鈥淲as it crude geopolitics 鈥� a 鈥榖lue grab鈥� of strategically valuable ocean? Or was it environmental zeal?鈥�
The memos suggest a potent but confused mix of both.
The MPA idea came from the , a US-based non-profit organisation. Miliband adopted it in May 2009, becoming 鈥渞eally fired up鈥�, as one official memo put it. He held a quick public consultation, during which one of the 5000 exiled Chagossians complained: 鈥淭he fish will have more rights than us.鈥� On 30 March 2010, he said he wanted to go ahead before the general election on 6 May. His officials, the memos reveal, were horrified 鈥� especially by the haste.
鈥淭his approach risks deciding (and being seen to decide) policy on the hoof for political timetabling reasons rather than on the basis of expert advice and public consultation,鈥� wrote Andrew Allen, head of Southern Oceans at the Foreign Office. Joanne Yeadon, head of the BIOT section, feared a legal challenge, where the government would need to show 鈥渁 conscientious and careful decision-making process. A rapid decision now would undermine that.鈥�
When Miliband established the MPA on 1 April, perhaps he was consciously aping George W. Bush. In virtually his last act as US president in 2009, Bush set up a , despite warnings that it extended beyond US territorial waters and was opposed by island leaders.
At any rate, Miliband was joining a trend for combining conservation with geopolitics. Ten mega-MPAs have been established in the past decade. But the conservation case is sketchy, says Pierre Leenhardt of the University of Perpignan, France. He that 鈥渨e still lack scientific studies showing their benefit or effectiveness鈥�, while in most cases they conflict with the rights of indigenous communities.
And so with Chagos, where Miliband鈥檚 officials considered the MPA bad science, bad economics, politically duplicitous and, most surprisingly, bad for the environment. Miliband argued that banning fishing was vital to protect ecosystems. But, as Dunne shows in his , much advice said otherwise. For one thing, fishing was minimal. The territory鈥檚 fisheries consultant, the Marine Resources Assessment Group, said the ban 鈥渨ill provide no conservation benefit for tuna鈥�, the main fish stock. That advice should have been heard at the heart of government, as MRAG founder John Beddington was then chief scientific adviser.
What an MPA would do was undermine resettlement plans. We know from US Embassy messages unearthed by Wikileaks that Miliband鈥檚 officials told the Americans that 鈥溾��. Now we know that is the case.
鈥淐reating a reserve,鈥� the director of overseas territories Colin Roberts wrote in a memo in May 2009, 鈥渃ould create a context for a raft of measures designed to weaken the [resettlement] movement.鈥� Top of his list were 鈥減resenting new evidence about the precariousness of any settlement鈥� amid a fishing ban, and 鈥渁ctivating the environmental lobby鈥�, which he thought would out-campaign the Chagossians.
Most conservationists predictably backed the MPA. But David Snoxell, a former British high commissioner to Mauritius, . And what did the greens get? The truth is that the civil servants believed all along that the marine environment could be worse off.
Before, there was a small sustainable licensed fishery. Licence fees paid for patrols. And fishing crews could keep watch. With no licence revenues and no legal fishers, 鈥渨e have no means of enforcing a full no-take MPA鈥�, wrote Yeadon. It would 鈥渓ead to reduced rather than enhanced environmental protection鈥�.
Quite so. Right now, there is only one patrol boat, funded by a private foundation. Nobody thinks that is adequate.
Meanwhile, the UK government has commissioned consultants to review the 鈥渞esettlement options鈥� for the Chagossians. Don鈥檛 hold your breath. The memos say resettlement is a 鈥渞ed line鈥� the Foreign Office won鈥檛 cross. A legal challenge to the MPA failed this year, but more may follow. Whatever the outcome, the MPA鈥檚 creation looks, as the memos and embassy messages suggested, as much about politics as high-minded conservation.
This article appeared in print under the headline 鈥淭rouble in paradise鈥�
