President Trump will be inaugurated on 20 January. We don鈥檛 yet know what a Trump presidency will look like, but some of the policies he and his team have already floated would have irreversible ramifications. But resistance is far from futile, as we explore in this four-part special.
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WELCOME to the new normal. Even before Donald Trump was elected, the US was already in a 鈥溾��.
As Edward Snowden revealed in 2013, the US government鈥檚 surveillance powers had expanded dramatically under the Obama administration. Trump has repeatedly signalled that he intends to make much greater use of these capabilities 鈥� perhaps inspired by British legislation that has given the UK government unprecedented power to snoop on its citizens.
In both cases, such powers were ostensibly introduced to combat terrorism. But there鈥檚 very little evidence that greater spying powers actually catch terrorists, many of whom already know how to evade spooks. On the other hand, there is mounting concern among privacy advocates and human rights campaigners that such powers will stifle domestic dissent and enable political witch-hunts.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not the government you have now that鈥檚 the issue,鈥� says Harry Halpin of the World Wide Web Consortium. 鈥淚t鈥檚 the government you might have in the future. In the US, everyone said, well the NSA isn鈥檛 so bad, Obama is such a rational guy. Now we have Trump wanting to create a .鈥�
So how will the state鈥檚 creeping expansion of its eavesdropping capabilities affect the right to protest? The UK鈥檚 Investigatory Powers Act 鈥� known as the 鈥渟noopers鈥� charter鈥� 鈥� goes far beyond what even the US has made legal, granting government authority to force internet service providers (ISPs) to collect information on their users, and the ability to hack into devices on very broad warrants.
Most people are not against the idea of targeted surveillance to bring down terror plots, for example, says Adrian Kennard who runs Andrews & Arnold, a small, privacy-oriented ISP in the UK. The problem is, the UK鈥檚 targets are not 鈥渢argeted鈥� at all 鈥� the focus could be 鈥渆veryone in Manchester鈥�, Kennard says. 鈥淥r they might decide to target everyone connected to a BT broadband line.鈥�
Trump is certain to take inspiration from the UK, says Danny O鈥橞rien of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. The US and UK are already planning to weaken the protections on cross-border access to data, he says, allowing UK law enforcement to seize communications from Google and Facebook without a US warrant 鈥� and vice versa.
Whether or not he pushes for new rules, Trump is very unlikely to roll back any existing measures. No one else will, either. Overreach in other spheres could plausibly be reversed in future, but powers of surveillance are in political terms nearly impossible to roll back: not only are they seductive, but no government wants to be accused of being soft on security.
At risk
Legal challenges to such powers are being mounted on both sides of the Atlantic. But the bottom line is that online privacy looks set to be fatally eroded.
So what鈥檚 really so bad about Donald Trump and UK prime minister Theresa May riffling through your computer and your communications? After all, if you鈥檙e not a terrorist, you have nothing to fear, right?
This view is desperately naive, says Halpin. 鈥淚f you think you have nothing to hide, you probably do,鈥� he says. 鈥淎nd if you think you haven鈥檛 broken any laws, I promise that you have.鈥�
One concern is that poorly framed or antiquated laws can be used as a pretext to prosecute or harass anyone who falls foul of powerful interests 鈥� much as they have previously been used to prosecute hackers.
In the US, one such law could be the arcane Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, created in 1986, which makes it a federal crime to access a computer in a manner that 鈥渆xceeds authorized access鈥�. Companies have occasionally used the CFAA to bring civil suits against competitors, but the real threat goes far beyond that, because it can criminalise violations of websites鈥� terms of service 鈥� even something as trivial as lying on a dating website, says Esha Bandari, a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union, which is .
Whether violations are pursued is 鈥渁t the mercy of prosecutors鈥� discretion,鈥� she says. Just because they haven鈥檛 exercised that discretion until now doesn鈥檛 mean they won鈥檛: 鈥淭hat makes the law open to discriminatory enforcement,鈥� she says.
In this light, what is dangerous about bulk data collection is that it makes fishing expeditions possible, says Jim Killock from the UK鈥檚 Open Rights Group. All this data is kept somewhere, forever. 鈥淭hey can search and process that data to get new and interesting material, and decide whether you鈥檙e a suspect for something. It鈥檚 quite chilling,鈥� he says.
Is this possible to avoid? 鈥淭he answer is not to have the data in the first place, so there鈥檚 nothing to store,鈥� says , head of security at Google DeepMind, who is also a director at the Open Rights Group. Security experts point to the Tor network, which anonymises and encrypts your trail through the internet. But it might not be so simple. 鈥淯nder the IP act, using Tor will put a target on your back,鈥� says Killock. Trump鈥檚 proposed CIA boss has called the use of encryption a 鈥渞ed flag鈥�. Once flagged, bulk hacking powers include a provision to break into your device and slurp up its contents.
A 鈥渧irtual private network鈥� might seem a better idea, but only if you are : not all will keep your data away from governments. Switzerland, for example, might be a good place to stash money, but has a . VPN providers based in the Netherlands or Germany offer stronger protection under their national privacy laws.
And even the most secure VPN is going to do little good if the computer you are using is open to attacks. The Apple ecosystem is generally more likely to protect privacy; while Google鈥檚 security is excellent, its implementations vary by hardware. That makes an iPhone a better bet for security than an Android device.
The software you use matters, too. Secure chat services may not be that secure. Whether or not Telegram was really , Halpin says his group has also broken the protocol. WhatsApp . 鈥淚 recommend people use Signal,鈥� he says. 鈥淚t鈥檚 the most reliable and secure peer-reviewed text messaging app.鈥�
鈥淭rying to evade snooping by using Tor or encryption might put a target on your back鈥�
As for email, Halpin suggests using , if you are concerned about snoopers. 鈥淭hey have no history of complying with requests for email. Lots of high-risk people go there,鈥� he says.
The rest of us could do worse than Gmail. 鈥淕oogle has been resistant to court orders it finds overreaching,鈥� claims Laurie.
Even if civil society has trouble mobilising against a surveillance state, all is not lost. Even now, Halpin says the W3C and other groups that run the infrastructure of the internet are teaming up with companies like Apple and Google to in by default. 鈥淢aking encrypted software easier for the average person to use is a civic responsibility,鈥� he says. The real resistance may just be getting started.
This article appeared in print under the headline 鈥淲hat鈥檚 the worst that could happen?鈥�
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