IT ISN鈥橳 easy to choose the worst part of the UK鈥檚 Digital Economy bill. Put forward as a long-overdue upgrade to UK policy last July, the bill was meant to make the country a competitive player on the digital scene. This week, it is being scrutinised in committee in the House of Lords. 鈥淭his is a crucial stage of the debate when the bill can be amended,鈥� says Jim Killock of campaign organisation Open Rights Group.
And the bill really does need amending, because key concerns have been left unaddressed. Alongside gestures like everyone having the right to broadband, it also contains some head-scratchers. One is the Sisyphean requirement that all adult sites in the world be vetted by the British Board of Film Classification.
That鈥檚 just impractical, but one provision is actually dangerous: a requirement for age verification for all sites and applications containing pornographic material, in an attempt to protect children.
Advertisement
鈥淚t鈥檚 almost impossible to do age verification without confirming your identity,鈥� says Adrian Kennard of internet service provider Andrews & Arnold.
Read more: The high cost of being digital
The first problem with this is that there is absolutely nothing in the bill detailing how age verification might work, but there are some clues. The draft of the bill sets out that simply checking a box or filling out your date of birth won鈥檛 be enough 鈥� they want proof. Possible methods floated include providing details from driving licences or passports, or maybe matching electoral record information or bank details. More outlandish options include retinal scans or selfies.
So who will be responsible for collecting and storing this extremely sensitive information? Here, too, the draft is vague, but the bill seems open to a number of options. One is to force porn site operators 鈥� in the UK and elsewhere 鈥� to set up infrastructure that collects people鈥檚 personal information to verify they are over 18. A second possibility is that your ISP would be forced to verify your age, effectively creating a giant database of personal data.
鈥淎shley Madison showed that collating personal information with sexual preferences is a bad idea鈥�
However it鈥檚 done, collating such information with your sexual preferences isn鈥檛 a great idea, as the hack of infidelity dating site Ashley Madison 鈥� and attendant blackmails and suicides 鈥� showed in 2015.
As the bill is currently worded, whoever is appointed to become the age verification regulator isn鈥檛 bound by duty to protect against any security risks that could result. 鈥淭his will be a gourmet feast for hackers,鈥� warns Kennard. Ensuring that a database of extremely desirable data 鈥� proof of identity, proof of age and porn preferences 鈥� is unhackable is a near impossible task.
But even if it can be achieved, it will still make us less secure. That鈥檚 because fraudsters will use the opportunity to create fake sites that resemble genuine porn sites and ask for the same data as the UK-verified ones, says Kennard.
There鈥檚 some cause for optimism that the age verification provision won鈥檛 become law. On 17 January the House of Lords Constitution Committee published a scathing report that said it wants more info about how such a system will work.
Ultimately, the bill won鈥檛 work anyway: 鈥淵ou can legally bypass all of this by using a virtual private network (VPN). And it鈥檚 easy 鈥� so what鈥檚 the point?鈥� says Kennard.
This article appeared in print under the headline 鈥淎ge verification for porn sites won鈥檛 work鈥�
