杏吧原创

This doctor risked her career to end Flint鈥檚 water-poisoning crisis

The people of Flint, Michigan, were drinking poisoned water, and the authorities were doing nothing. That鈥檚 when Mona Hanna-Attisha decided to take action
Mona Hanna-Attisha
Mona Hanna-Attisha, and the river at the centre of the crisis
Joe Vaughn/Redux/Eyevine

IT鈥橲 the morning of 24 September 2015, and Mona Hanna-Attisha is hours away from the biggest moment of her scientific career. Then her phone rings. As she recalls in her new book, it was a representative from her medical school at Michigan State University, calling to say the institution wasn鈥檛 in a position to support her in what she was about to do. 鈥淚 felt like I was being thrown under a bus,鈥 she says.

Hanna-Attisha was about to go public with some controversial and horrifying evidence: that the children in Flint, Michigan, were being poisoned by lead in the drinking water. Her revelation went against the state, the scientific consensus 鈥 and now her university.

Just a month or so earlier, Hanna-Attisha had been urging the children in her care to drink the water in place of unhealthy sugary drinks 鈥 she felt it was her duty as an associate professor at MSU鈥檚 College of Medicine in Flint and a paediatrician in the city鈥檚 Hurley Medical Center. What had changed?

Concerns had been growing about Flint鈥檚 water supply for well over a year. When car giant General Motors (GM), founded in Flint, began downsizing its operations there in 1978, the city鈥檚 economy went into a long decline. In April 2014, as a money-saving measure, the city stopped buying its water supply from nearby Detroit, opting instead to pull water from the Flint river. It wasn鈥檛 long before locals began to complain that the water smelled and tasted bad.

By early 2015 the Flint authorities admitted that the water had initially contained potentially , but stressed that it was now safe to drink. Hanna-Attisha had trusted that line.

Born in the UK to Iraqi parents, Hanna-Attisha has lived in Michigan since she was a child; her father was a GM engineer. It was a chance conversation with a childhood friend that alerted her to the problem. The friend, an environmental engineer, told her about a at the Environmental Protection Agency. He and Flint resident LeeAnne Walters had concluded that the Flint River water was not being treated properly and as a result had begun to corrode the city鈥檚 aged water pipes. They reported lead in the water supply and speculated that it was coming from those pipes.

There is in drinking water. It affects every organ in the body and especially the nervous system. 鈥淟ead is a neurotoxin,鈥 says Hanna-Attisha. 鈥淚t is potent and its effects are irreversible.鈥 Children are particularly vulnerable because their brains are still developing. 鈥淓ven the lowest levels can cause steep declines in cognition,鈥 she says.

The level of lead in Flint鈥檚 water wasn鈥檛 low: some samples contained 13.2 milligrams of lead per litre. It wasn鈥檛 just unsafe to drink, it should have been .

鈥淚t was a call to action,鈥 says Hanna-Attisha, and she immediately tried to draw attention to the problem. To her dismay, she says, the authorities showed no desire to act. Even some of her colleagues seemed unconcerned: they agreed that children are at risk from paint 鈥 lead was once added as a pigment 鈥 but not from water.

Papers from as early as the 1980s can leach into the body, found no clear link. Although the EPA considers water with a high lead concentration to be hazardous, this historical confusion seems to linger.

If she was to change minds, Hanna-Attisha realised she would need evidence that lead levels in the blood of Flint residents had risen after the water switch.

The clock was ticking: thousands of people were drinking Flint river water. But getting access to such data can take years. When a similar crisis played out in Washington DC in the early 2000s, Marc Edwards of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg was only able to show four years after the crisis ended.

But Hanna-Attisha is a doctor and the Hurley Medical Center tests the blood lead levels of Flint鈥檚 children as part of routine healthcare. She already had the data.

She and her team worked round the clock. 鈥淲e checked, we double-checked, we triple-checked, we quadruple-checked this data,鈥 she says, and the results were clear. The number of children with high levels of lead in their blood had risen significantly following the change in water supply.

On 21 September, she went to the local authorities with her results, but she says they seemed unwilling to act. Hanna-Attisha felt she had no choice but to go public. As the hour of the press conference approached, the room filled with journalists and camera crews. Flanked by her team, Hanna-Attisha remembers her voice sounding calm and assured 鈥 even as her heart thudded in her chest. She had felt like the holder of an awful secret, and it was a relief to set it free. By early evening .

鈥淲hen the entire state is telling you you鈥檙e wrong鈥 it is hard not to believe them鈥

Instead of being congratulated for her work, however, she found herself under attack. A spokesperson for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality called her conclusions 鈥渦nfortunate鈥 in a time of 鈥渘ear hysteria鈥. The state governor鈥檚 office went further, saying Hanna-Attisha鈥檚 team had 鈥溾 the data. 鈥淭hat was definitely the lowest point,鈥 she says. 鈥淲hen the entire state is telling you you鈥檙e wrong, that feels like crap. And it鈥檚 hard not to believe them at a certain point.鈥

Days passed. Hanna-Attisha says she was sick with worry. What if she was wrong and worrying people needlessly? Or, worse, she was right and nothing was going to happen?

Then, suddenly, the local authority declared a . On 1 October it announced that residents should drink bottled water or use water filters. Significantly, some reporters had analysed figures the state had released to counter Hanna-Attisha鈥檚 findings and found that they actually supported her claims. Her conclusions were accepted. A fortnight later, Flint was supply 鈥 something the state had spent months claiming wasn鈥檛 feasible. It was just 52 days since Hanna-Attisha had become aware of the lead problem.

The full impact of the crisis remains to be seen. Some during the period water came from the Flint river. Other studies link the improperly treated water to an outbreak of Legionnaire鈥檚 disease in which 12 people died. Some people connected with the Flint water crisis may face charges of involuntary manslaughter. And there are still some concerns around Flint鈥檚 water: all of the lead pipes need replacing, and that has not yet happened.

Lead exposure causes permanent damage. The only option is to try to mitigate its effects, and that is where Hanna-Attisha is directing her attention. When I visit, she takes me on a tour of the Hurley centre. It鈥檚 an , and is where she now leads the Pediatric Public Health Initiative, a multi-pronged project to provide as much health and social support as possible for Flint鈥檚 children. Although the parents coming and going from the centre with their children look just like parents everywhere, Hanna-Attisha says that below the surface they are angry 鈥 and anxious about what the future holds.

Whatever that may be, there is no doubt Hanna-Attisha鈥檚 intervention prevented an even worse situation. When Washington DC had its lead problem, the people drank the water for more than three years. 鈥淚t felt like I was the right person at the right time in the right place and with the right team,鈥 she says.

This article appeared in print under the headline 鈥淪omething in the water鈥

Topics: Health / Water