
IN 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union. Since then, the country has been in crisis. Talk has been of virtually nothing else. Then there is the talk about the talk. 鈥淭o say the present era is one of crisis borders on clich茅,鈥 writes Aaron Bastani in his polemical manifesto Fully Automated Luxury Communism.
What else could he say, given the situation? This grim picture is expanded on in two more books. In Measuring Poverty Around the World, Anthony Atkinson wrestles with the fact that even as countries become wealthier, poverty remains entrenched. And David Blanchflower鈥檚 central theme is the crisis of underemployment and underpayment, yet his title Not Working expresses a more general failure of the global economy as well.
Since the end of the cold war, Atkinson writes, 鈥渢he attitude of Western democracies has been that their view of the world鈥檚 political organisations has triumphed鈥. Bastani calls this 鈥渃apitalist realism鈥 鈥 the idea that capitalism is the only plausible system 鈥 and cites political scientist Francis Fukuyama鈥檚 influential argument about reaching the end of history. Yet, in 2008, history returned.
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As Blanchflower puts it, 鈥渟omething horrible happened鈥. All three authors agree that the current malaise derives from the financial crisis of 2007-8, and the cataclysmic mishandling of its aftermath by those in power.
Blanchflower was among those who were tasked with handling the crisis. He was serving on the Bank of England鈥檚 Monetary Policy Committee and told everyone that austerity would make things worse. Nobody listened.
Instead, George Osborne, then the UK鈥檚 chancellor of the exchequer, 鈥渁 reverse Robin Hood鈥, seized a 鈥渦nique political opportunity鈥 to reduce the size of the state and never mind the social and economic consequences鈥. Internationally, a perverse illogic prevailed, as US talk show host Stephen Colbert pointed out at the time: 鈥淲e have to keep cutting government budgets and laying off people until those people get jobs.鈥
More than a decade on, people are still hurting. They often can鈥檛 find employment, or the scant work they can find offers little security or pay. They have no prospect that their living conditions will be ameliorated. Rightly, many of these people blame the 鈥渓earneds鈥 who failed to predict the crash. For example, a limo driver told Blanchflower that people voted Brexit because 鈥渙rdinary people had no hope鈥. How can we have hope when policy-makers haven鈥檛 learned from their mistakes?
Worse, as Blanchflower says, these policy-makers 鈥渘ow have little firepower to deal with the onset of the next economic crisis鈥. If you are already despondent about the situation, I guarantee this book will make you feel worse.
Atkinson, too, refused to sugar-coat his subject. Sadly, he died before finishing this book, but it has been brought to publication, at his request, by his colleagues John Micklewright and Andrea Brandolini. With its unfinished chapters explored in afterwords by economists Fran莽ois Bourguignon and Nicholas Stern, it is at the very least a worthy successor to Atkinson鈥檚 2015 study Inequality: What can be done?
Atkinson became an economist in the 1960s after working with deprived children in Hamburg, Germany, and published major works, beginning with The Economics of Inequality in 1975.
Five decades on, says Atkinson, poverty remains 鈥渙ne of the two great challenges facing the world as a whole today, along with climate change, with whose consequences poverty is intimately connected鈥.
Atkinson considers various definitions of poverty, but his fundamental argument is that the free movement of capital, combined with governments鈥 failure to regulate and tax multinationals, has led to the loss of employment and to insecurity among workers and their families in many countries.
He agrees with Blanchflower and Bastani that this is a failure of the learneds: 鈥淥ur governments have lost sight of their obligation to act on behalf of all their citizens; they have allowed them to become subservient to economic forces.鈥 And he argues that 鈥渨e need to return to a situation where 鈥榯he economy鈥 is a means of fulfilling the life hopes and ambitions of people, not vice versa鈥. Wise words, but is anyone able to listen?
Atkinson and Blanchflower find that people want to work to earn money, and that having decent, fulfilling jobs makes people happier. Bastani argues that people would be even happier if they didn鈥檛 work at all. He proposes that we need to move from crisis to utopia 鈥 to 鈥渁 world beyond jobs, profit and even scarcity鈥. This is the 鈥渇ully automated luxury communism鈥 of his title.

鈥淗ow can we have hope about the future when policy-makers haven鈥檛 learned from their mistakes?鈥
Bastani evokes Karl Marx鈥檚 idea that automation will create 鈥渁 society in which work is eliminated, scarcity replaced by abundance and where labour and leisure blend into one another鈥. Robots will do physical tasks such as driving and delivering things. We will 鈥渕ine the sky鈥 thanks to Elon Musk鈥檚 innovations in conquering the final frontier. Life expectancy will be enhanced by gene therapies. Our expanding population will be fed by cultured meat. The new populism will be 鈥渓uxury populism鈥: socialist and environmentally aware.
In Bastani鈥檚 view, Marx was let down by the technological insufficiencies of every era prior to ours; this is the first time our technology has been sufficient to give rise to a post-scarcity economy, if we want it, and a realm of plenty 鈥渂eyond imagination鈥.
What Bastani doesn鈥檛 quite imagine, however, is a world in which people might actually enjoy their work. Where in Bastani鈥檚 utopia is the place for someone whose version of socialism is more William Morris than Karl Marx, someone who values work as an end in itself?
Like Blanchflower and Atkinson, Bastani identifies elite learneds as the source of our ills. And for his luxury communism to work, these elites have to agree not to pocket the trillions they stand to make but, instead, to share the profits.
What happens if Musk doesn鈥檛 鈥渨ant it鈥? Maybe he is happy with the way things are. Regardless, there will be no storming of the Winter Palace in Bastani鈥檚 utopia, because, he writes, his politics 鈥渞ecognises the centrality of human rights, most importantly the right of personal happiness鈥.
Bastani鈥檚 future is interesting: 鈥渁 figurehead of possibility forged for a world changing so rapidly that new utopias are needed 鈥 because the old ones no longer make sense鈥. It is a dream to replace the bankrupt capitalist dream, and to counter the dark fantasies of non-luxury populists.
These authors understand that there has been a lot of talk already. They believe we need better talk. They are all highly intelligent people who are trying to understand why the situation in which we find ourselves is so stupid. Their books all have virtues, but if you can only face one, then, for mea culpas and an honest if demoralising insider view, read Blanchflower. For devastating statistical analysis, read Atkinson. For riotous techno-optimism, read Bastani.
It is a wonder Bastani missed the opportunity to call his theory Totally Automated Luxury Communism, or TALC. TALC, which we could liberally sprinkle across our broken world. TALC to mitigate all the TALK.
Princeton University Press
Verso
Princeton University Press