A covert investigation by a US government watchdog has found that someone using fake companies and fraudulent licences could obtain enough radioactive material to build a 鈥渄irty bomb鈥�, without ever having their credentials checked out. Federal regulators don鈥檛 have plans to fix the loophole in licensing rules until at least the end of 2023.
Dirty bombs, also called radiological dispersal devices, use regular explosives to spread radioactive material. A 2017 from Sandia National Laboratories found a large dirty bomb detonated in lower Manhattan in New York could cause as much $30 billion dollars in damage. Even though no one would die immediately from the radiation itself, there could be as many as 1500 fatalities from the evacuation, such as from relocating vulnerable people.
In 2019, Congress member Bennie Thompson asked the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 鈥� a nonpartisan congressional agency 鈥� to investigate issues related to the security of radioactive materials following that found vulnerabilities to how the materials are licensed. In the US, licensing is managed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and state governments.
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To test the licensing process against fraud, GAO investigators set up two shell companies authorised to purchase radioactive material using fraudulent paper licences. Investigators then ordered radioactive materials from two different US vendors.
The quantity of material from each vendor was small enough that the vendors were not required to verify licences before fulfilling orders. Together, however, the material from the vendors added up to a more strictly controlled 鈥渃ategory 2鈥� quantity, which is between 10 and 1000 times the amount of radioactive material needed to cause permanent human injury. If investigators had ordered a category 2 quantity directly, the vendors would have been required to verify the licence with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the state.
GAO agents waited until the material was delivered before refusing each order, ensuring it was returned safely to the vendor. Material from one vendor arrived in a metal bucket; material from the other arrived in a regular cardboard box. Some of the details of the investigation were not included in the .
at Tufts University in Massachusetts says the report is 鈥渞e-ringing an alarm bell鈥� on inadequate controls around access to radioactive materials. She says concerns about domestic terrorism and other violent acts make warnings about dirty bombs more urgent. 鈥淲e鈥檙e living in a time of unfortunately worrisome scenarios,鈥� she says. According to the GAO report, officials at the National Nuclear Security Administration believe there is increasing interest in making a dirty bomb.
The report is especially concerning given that the US has a relatively robust framework for tracking and licensing radioactive material, says at the Stimson Center, a security think tank in Washington DC. Elsewhere, 鈥渢here are not even loopholes. There are vast tunnels,鈥� he says.
Radioactive materials in small quantities are widely used for medical and industrial applications, ranging from irradiating blood to identifying geological formations in oil wells. 鈥淭hese are everywhere,鈥� says Cupitt. 鈥淓very country uses radioactive sources for something.鈥�
In a , Thompson said the report highlights 鈥渁 clear national security issue that the Federal government must remedy.鈥�
New rules from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for purchasing smaller quantities of radioactive material would close the loophole, but any changes aren鈥檛 expected to go into effect until the end of 2023 at the earliest, says Allison Bawden, who led the GAO investigation. She says the commission should act now to make licensing more secure.
A spokesperson for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission told New 杏吧原创 it has warned vendors to be vigilant of unusual activity and it has expedited the rule change, but that immediately making a change 鈥渨ould risk unintended impacts to important and safe medical, academic and industrial uses of these materials鈥�.
In addition to tighter controls, regulators could push to reduce the amount of radioactive material available, says Bawden. A GAO in 2021 found there were viable alternatives to radioactive materials in some cases 鈥� for instance blood irradiators 鈥� but other uses couldn鈥檛 easily be replaced.
