There is a question frequently repeated by sceptics of plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions in Western nations: what about China? This simplistic refrain asks the right question for the wrong reasons. That is because China plays a paradoxical role in the global picture of climate change. It is now by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, annually pumping out . It is also the world鈥檚 largest builder and supplier of clean energy technologies that are key to cutting those emissions.
As the transition away from fossil fuels proceeds, the Chinese government has increasingly used聽this status for geopolitical leverage, positioning the country to play an ever more dominant role in the 21st century and shaping global progress on climate change 鈥� for better or worse.
Its path to becoming a green superpower has multiple stages, starting with the energy transition within its own borders. 鈥淭he scale of clean energy investment is without parallel,鈥� says at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air聽in Finland. 鈥淲e exhausted all superlatives a couple of years ago.鈥�
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In 2023, which will be a record year for global development of renewable energy, more than half of all new wind and solar capacity is set to be installed in China. It is聽also adding more new nuclear power and hydropower than anywhere else, and in August . In June, two years ahead of schedule, , though coal remains a big and growing part of its energy mix (see 鈥淭he coal question鈥�, below).
China boasts record adoption of聽electric vehicles too, with these , as well as the world鈥檚 largest high-speed train system. A general economic malaise has also created a 鈥渢ail wind鈥� for its emissions reductions, says Myllyvirta.
All of this gives observers confidence that China will, at the聽very least, be able to meet its near-term target of by 2030 or earlier. 鈥淭hose are going to be snowballs rolling by themselves,鈥� says at Greenpeace East Asia. from Norwegian research firm Rystad Energy has even projected that China鈥檚 emissions from burning fossil fuels could peak as soon as this year, and fall 10 per cent by 2030.
By aggressively growing its own聽clean energy, China has also reduced costs everywhere else. 鈥淭hey鈥檝e done the world a huge favour,鈥� says at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, UK. It is largely thanks to those falling costs that than new fossil fuel capacity in much of the world. That, in turn, has made China the dominant supplier of much of the world鈥檚 solar panels, wind turbine parts, batteries and the minerals with which all of these are made.
For instance, China now makes at least 80 per cent of the world鈥檚 solar panels and counting. The first half of this year saw panel exports from China increase by more than a third compared with the same period in 2022, according to a , to a total of 114 gigawatts of generating capacity 鈥� equivalent to all the solar capacity currently installed in the US.
Overseas investment
In addition, China has increasingly invested directly in clean energy overseas. Since the launch of its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, it聽has spent just over $1聽trillion on various infrastructure projects in聽nearly 150 countries, including hundreds of billions for oil and gas or coal-related projects. But the nation now appears to be greening these investments. According to a聽 from researchers at Fudan University in Shanghai, China, around half of the $12.3 billion the country has spent on foreign energy in 2023 went to clean energy, ranging from hydropower in Pakistan to a giant floating solar farm in Zimbabwe. Although the overall amount was lower than previous years, that makes China鈥檚 outlays this year the greenest of the past decade.
China鈥檚 green power influence is particularly being felt in lower-income countries. For instance, it with South Africa to supply it with more solar panels as well as upgrade an ageing nuclear plant and coal plant. According to Ember, while China exports most of its solar panels to聽Europe, sales to Africa have increased this year by nearly 200聽per cent and exports to the Middle East jumped 64 per cent. A聽notable exception was a 76 per cent decline in exports to India, which has prioritised its own domestic solar manufacturing.
China also has a growing role in directly financing environmental efforts in lower-income nations, beyond spending through the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2016, it pledged $3.1 billion for climate-related projects in such places, though according to a report from聽climate think tank E3G, it has delivered just 10 per cent of that so聽far. Calls for more spending by China 鈥� to聽pay for climate-related 鈥渓oss and聽damage鈥� 鈥� are expected at the upcoming COP28 climate summit.
China鈥檚 clean energy dominance has spurred its competitors to try to catch up. In the US, the Biden administration鈥檚 Inflation Reduction Act, which put hundreds of billions of dollars聽towards clean energy聽development, was shaped聽by a聽desire to establish domestic industries that are less聽dependent聽on China.
One reason for doing so is concern about embargoes on key聽technologies or materials, such as China鈥檚 recently enacted on gallium and germanium, two key minerals for advanced electronics. This type of聽manoeuvre has , who can influence the global economy by deciding to produce more or less oil.
Mineral influence
鈥淚n this critical minerals context, we are up against a dominant supplier that is willing to weaponise market power for political gain,鈥� said US energy secretary Jennifer Granholm at an聽International Energy Agency meeting on 28 September, in .
But at Princeton University says that control of clean energy supply chains wouldn鈥檛 offer as much geopolitical leverage as control of聽oil. Unlike an oil embargo, export controls on clean energy technology or minerals wouldn鈥檛 be felt immediately in the same way as fuel pumps drying up, and聽other countries would have聽more time to respond by聽expanding their own manufacturing capacity. Unlike聽OPEC, China is also the聽main consumer of all the clean聽technology it makes.
But unease about China鈥檚 clean power dominance is exacerbated by the nation鈥檚 slower targets on聽cutting emissions relative to聽Western countries, a key source聽of聽the 鈥淲hat about China?鈥� sentiment. While the US and the European Union have pledged to聽substantially cut emissions by 2030, China is aiming only to peak emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. China鈥檚 leaders have said the country鈥檚 official status at the UN as a 鈥渄eveloping鈥� nation, as well as its聽smaller share of historical emissions, justifies the delayed cuts 鈥� its per-capita emissions are also lower than those in some other leading economies.
But many have argued China could move faster. US climate envoy John Kerry did just that during a visit to Beijing in July to discuss how the two superpowers might work together on climate change despite growing hostilities. During the visit, China鈥檚 president, Xi Jinping, said in a 聽that the country鈥檚 path to decarbonise 鈥渕ust be determined by ourselves, and will never be influenced by others鈥�.
A major sticking point is China鈥檚 ongoing expansion of coal power, which is responsible for most of its emissions. One from Global Energy Monitor found there are currently 243 gigawatts of coal power under construction or permitted in China, more than聽the total capacity of current US coal plants. This boom isn鈥檛 necessarily incompatible with China鈥檚 official climate targets, but聽researchers say it is still a disaster for the climate. 鈥淭here is no way to defend the current coal expansion,鈥� says Li at Greenpeace.
Challenges remain
The country鈥檚 later carbon-neutral target date of 2060 may also be a tacit acknowledgement of the true difficulty of fully decarbonising. One big challenge, beyond the sheer scale of China鈥檚 current emissions, is that a large share of聽them come from difficult-to-decarbonise heavy industries. In 2020, emissions from China鈥檚 steel and cement sectors alone were .
A shift to a less energy intensive economy with less construction and large-scale infrastructure could help here, says Myllyvirta, but lots will remain to be done. describe the need for expanded use of green hydrogen, as well as unproven carbon capture and storage and other technologies, including geoengineering. Success here isn鈥檛 guaranteed.
And yet, China seems to be well鈥憄ositioned to gain ever more influence as its energy transition accelerates, regardless of what happens with its own or overall emissions. Andrews-Speed says, assuming there isn鈥檛 a major event that isolates or destabilises China, such as a war with Taiwan, he sees a future in which its clean energy dominance comes to resemble the reach of the US oil industry after the second world war. Just as that influence shaped the 20th century globally, so too could China鈥檚 green dominance shape this century.
The coal question
Why is China building so many new coal power plants? The common explanation is energy security, a long-standing concern in China that escalated to a crisis following a series of severe blackouts in 2021 and 2022. These were driven both by drought reducing the amount of available hydropower and heatwaves raising demand for electricity for air conditioning. China doesn鈥檛 have much oil or gas, but it has abundant coal to fall back on.
Another explanation is that the coal plants can help back up the growing amount of intermittent wind and solar resources on the grid. In that case, if the power stations are used less even as more are built, emissions from coal could fall, despite there being more plants, says at the Lantau Group, a Hong Kong-based energy consultancy. 鈥淭his is China,鈥� he says. 鈥淭hey can build a plant and not run it as much as they need.鈥�
However, China鈥檚 existing coal聽power would be sufficient for聽both those purposes, says at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in Finland. He says the plants are only operated at half capacity on average, largely because China鈥檚 electricity market is run in a rigid and centrally controlled way, with decisions about buying and selling power decided by administrators rather than market prices.
Despite some , that has big consequences for emissions. A from at Johns Hopkins University in Maryland and his colleagues found the resulting inefficient decisions around producing and buying electricity between 2011 and 2019 were responsible for more emissions than India鈥檚 total over the same period. 鈥淐hina is moving slower than it should and we are going to pay a price for that,鈥� says聽Urpelainen.
There have been efforts at reform, but they have been sedate and incomplete. Myllyvirta puts this down to pushback from entrenched interests among provincial governments and power聽producers. 鈥淲hen you change the rules, some people win, some people lose,鈥� he says.
An even less benign explanation is that coal producers want to get in while they still can, says at Greenpeace East Asia. In a 2021 speech, China鈥檚 president, Xi聽Jinping, said its . Li says coal developers are rushing to build as聽much as possible before the peak arrives. 鈥淕ot to make sure you get on the last train,鈥� he says.
