Quantum computers were once nothing more than a plaything for physicists, but as their capabilities have grown, so too has the attention from governments. The US, China and European nations are all racing to develop these exotic machines, while carefully balancing national security needs with commercial opportunities. But have they got the balance right?
The first nation to develop a sufficiently powerful quantum computer will be able to crack many encryption algorithms in use today and gain access to the rest of the world鈥檚 secrets 鈥� including encrypted data that is being collected now in the hope of decrypting it in the future. That means there is a geopolitical advantage in getting there first and stopping adversaries catching up, says at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.
In terms of getting there first, state spending is already high. Figures from a 2022 report by consultancy firm McKinsey that China had committed $15.3 billion at that point, while European Union governments had earmarked $7.2 billion 鈥� including the EU鈥檚 own project 鈥� and the US $1.9 billion, some through its . More recent figures are harder to come by, and these numbers also ignore the fact that outside China a lot of investment in this sector involves private companies, such as Google, IBM and Intel.
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And no one seems too keen on sharing their work. As New 杏吧原创 reported last year, countries across Europe have implemented stringent export controls on quantum computers, while the US has since followed suit and banned its citizens from investing in quantum technologies in China and some other countries. H眉sch says similar export controls on other key technologies, such as chips used for AI research and cryptography, have had limited success. 鈥淭hey will delay the competition for a while, but history has shown that they鈥檙e typically not a silver bullet to stop adversaries,鈥� she says.
Quantum computing researchers are already unhappy about being caught in this geopolitical tussle. 鈥淚 have wonderful quantum computing colleagues in China who seem as open as can be 鈥� but collaboration between the US and China in quantum computing has indeed become harder,鈥� says from the University of Texas at Austin. 鈥淚t鈥檚 now extremely difficult for Chinese students to get visas to study quantum computing in the US. I view this as not only sad, but a massive self-own for the US, since so many of these students would settle in the US if we let them, and contribute further to the US鈥檚 lead in this area.鈥�
at the University of Oxford says he and colleagues have been warned by the university to watch for approaches by potential foreign spies, and he is concerned that simply publishing research could fall foul of the vague wording of current export controls. 鈥淚t鈥檚 almost entirely up to interpretation,鈥� says Kissinger. 鈥淎nd that鈥檚 kind of pouring some cold water on people wanting to start up big international collaborations.鈥�
The tense situation is also affecting commercial operations. at UK quantum computer startup Orca Computing says that despite the fact current machines aren鈥檛 sophisticated enough to fall foul of export controls, he wouldn鈥檛 consider selling to a Chinese customer. 鈥淭here鈥檚 sort of an unwritten rule, or a sort of gut-check that we all do about those things,鈥� says Murray. With the anticipation that quantum computers will eventually progress to the point that export controls apply, Orca has focused on working with European, Japanese and US clients, rather than push into markets like China. 鈥淚t鈥檚 incentivised us to be out there working with those countries. It presents less of a risk, both in terms of more long-term business, but also short-term questions asked [by the UK government].鈥�
Celia Merzbacher at the Quantum Economic Development Consortium, a trade body for quantum companies, says that at this point in the burgeoning industry, openness and international collaboration would be a better approach to secure progress than shoring up national capabilities. 鈥淪weeping trade barriers, including sanctions and export controls, and also subsidies to indigenous businesses, can slow innovation and threaten competition, which is bad for business,鈥� she says.
Overall, Kissinger says that concerns about the security threat of quantum computers and the need for export controls are probably overblown 鈥� but the issue is that state secrecy means we don鈥檛 know for sure why governments are putting limits in place. 鈥淣SA [the US National Security Agency] employs some very smart people who probably don鈥檛 talk about what they do,鈥� he says.
