Ukraine and Russia are now three years into what has been called the first drone war: not the first in which they were used, but the first in which they have been a major factor on the battlefield. What lessons have others drawn about the shape of future wars?
鈥淒rones are here to stay, and they will be everywhere 鈥� on the ground, in the air and at sea 鈥� in numbers,鈥� says at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia. 鈥淭he point of no return was passed in 2022.鈥�
Military drones were, of course, in use long before Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine that year, particularly rising to prominence with the US employment of Predator drones during the 2000s. However, the technology now being used and the scale at which it is being deployed 鈥� Russia and Ukraine each built more than a million military drones in 2024 鈥� are unlike anything we have ever seen. With global tensions rising, other nations are starting to think about how they might fight a drone war on a similar scale.
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鈥淲e can鈥檛 predict future developments, but many countries around the world are writing strategies for using drones, acquiring them and introducing in their military training,鈥� says Molloy. 鈥淭hese will define objectives and, at the highest level, will guide each country鈥檚 dos and don鈥檛s.鈥�
For example, the US Department of Defense (DoD) is now working to develop the capacity to , rather than its small numbers of high-end drones like the Predator at present. In Europe, a is developing a drone-manufacturing base to supply hardware to Ukraine, but will ultimately beef up domestic capacity, while the UK has tasked a Royal Air Force unit with testing drone swarm technology.
Part of the challenge in setting up these initiatives is that drone technology is evolving so fast. Molloy says people in Ukraine talk about a 40-day development cycle, rather than the years usually required to specify, develop, test and field new military hardware.
鈥淣othing drives innovation like an existential threat,鈥� says Molloy. 鈥淣ecessity is the mother of invention. War is the catalyst of technological innovations, and you can鈥檛 progress at the same speed in the peacetime. Our mindset isn鈥檛 adapted to it.鈥�
This rapid evolution means that any huge investments in hardware look speculative. The peacetime procurement cycle means drones might be obsolete before they can be delivered. But there is a growing awareness that nations need to plan for the age of drone warfare.
One concern for militaries is how dependent drone supply chains are on Chinese manufacturers. For example, last year US drone-maker Skydio was , limiting its supply of batteries and disrupting the company鈥檚 delivery schedule.
Both Russia and Ukraine have taken steps to make items such as batteries and flight controllers locally, in an effort to remove supply bottlenecks and to avoid the sudden price hikes during shortages. The US is yet to tackle this problem fully, however: the DoD has taken steps to ensure that drones don鈥檛 contain electronics from China or other nations that could compromise security, but hasn鈥檛 yet addressed the supply chain issue for more basic components.
鈥淒eveloping sovereign capability in drones allows a nation to independently design, manufacture and operate drones, providing greater control over their technology,鈥� says Molloy. 鈥淒omestic production also mitigates vulnerabilities associated with international supply chain disruptions and potential political constraints on foreign procurement.鈥�
As for China itself, it is unclear what lessons its armed forces are drawing from the conflict. Publicity videos from the People鈥檚 Liberation Army show Chinese troops training with small attack drones and robotic dogs, but it isn鈥檛 known whether these represent experiments, actual integration into infantry units or simply flashy propaganda. Molloy says it is hard to tell how much is real, but US defence analyst 聽says it seems plausible that China is moving to a drone-enabled force. 鈥淭he barriers for such integration seem pretty low.鈥�
Indeed, the low barriers to entry are what makes drones so different to other military technology, as they can be acquired on shoestring budgets. In Ukraine, infantry units have developed their own drone reconnaissance and strike capabilities using hardware donated by well-wishers or bought by the soldiers themselves.
The flip side of this is that nations need to consider the drones that will be deployed against them, with every future war likely to be a drone war. The problem is that nobody knows what drones will look like even in a few years. 鈥淵ou can鈥檛 develop counter-drones if you don鈥檛 know what鈥檚 coming next,鈥� says Molloy.
That means analysts are keeping a close eye on technologies now emerging in Ukraine, says Molloy, including fibre-optic-controlled drones that can鈥檛 be jammed and advances in artificial intelligence that allow drones to avoid incoming projectiles. 鈥淚t gets complicated when you are dealing with large numbers and different types of drones,鈥� she says.
For example, the battlefields of Ukraine are now seeing small quadcopters for reconnaissance and attack deployed alongside larger quadcopter bombers and fixed-wing attack drones, like Russia鈥檚 Lancet, or strategic attack drones with ranges of more than 1000 kilometres. Such attacks may come simultaneously from different speeds and altitudes, requiring multiple countermeasures. The only thing that seems clear is that existing defences aren鈥檛 adequate.
鈥淲e are close to a consensus that expensive missiles are not the solution to small drones at scale,鈥� says Kallenborn. Instead, future drone defence will need to be 鈥渃heap, sustainable and multi-dimensional鈥�, he says, able to counter large high-performance drones as well as swarms of smaller ones. This will involve a layered defence of radars and other sensors, with smart control systems linked to an arsenal of missiles, guns, jammers and interceptor drones that can be rapidly tasked to take down a mixed swarm.
Finally, there is the ultimate question when it comes to drones: can they replace human fighters entirely? Ukraine has been attempting to put uncrewed systems in the frontline and has even carried out an assault on Russian positions using . But Molloy says the rise of the robots isn鈥檛 yet complete.
鈥淒rones alone cannot win wars. We still need humans to hold ground. At present, drones are not capable of doing this,鈥� she says. 鈥淏ut it is possible this could happen in the next conflict.鈥�
