SYRIA, AD 256: Persian forces are under siege by the Romans. The attacking forces seek to tunnel under the Persian fortifications, but are met by a toxic mix of fumes from burning sulphur and bitumen. Syria, 2013: as yet unsubstantiated claims and counterclaims abound that chemical weapons have been deployed in the country.

The abhorrent effects of chemical warfare were unequivocally demonstrated during the first world war. This year, we mark the 25th anniversary of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s leadership.

Most governments now regard such weapons as militarily redundant, as demonstrated by their membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the production and use of chemical weapons, commits them to destroying all existing stocks, and prevents reacquisition. Yet advances in a range of scientific fields – such as neuroscience and nanotechnology – and the growing convergence of chemistry and biology, while offering the hope of benefits to medicine and civil society, also bring the .

There is an intrinsic connection between the military and civilian scientific communities; the military’s need for innovation has long been a driving force in research. But the potential for the adaptation and exploitation of scientific discovery for military advantage has rarely been greater.

“The potential to exploit scientific discovery for military advantage has rarely been greater”

Pursuing legitimate research while minimising the risk of misuse is a challenge for all. In 2011, I wrote in this magazine that the world needed to do more to guard against the growing threat of biological weapons. Now, I want to make the same case with regard to chemical weapons.

These issues are being discussed this month at the at The Hague in the Netherlands. The UK was a key player in negotiating agreement for the convention, which came into force in 1997, and although the threats we now face are very different from those that preoccupied the original negotiators, our commitment to it is undiminished. It remains a fundamental part of the international legal framework to tackle the threat of chemical weapons and has resulted in the destruction of four-fifths of the world’s declared stockpiles.

This is welcome, but we cannot afford to be complacent. The international community must ensure it is equipped to meet new challenges and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

The latest threat comes on several fronts. Consider the rapidly advancing field of neuroscience, in particular neuropharmacology. The potential benefits for treating neurological impairment, disease and psychiatric illness are immense; but so too are potentially harmful applications – specifically the development of a new range of lethal, as well as incapacitating, chemical warfare agents. Nanotech also has the potential to transform medical care, but could be used to .

We should not allow threats to hinder scientific progress. But we should do all we can to minimise the misuse of knowledge, materials, expertise and equipment for hostile purposes.

The scientific community must play its part. These issues should be a fundamental element of educational and professional training for scientists and engineers, along with clear guidance on the obligations imposed by the CWC to not develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons. Organisations such as the UK’s Royal Society are spearheading this work.

Significant challenges to the convention are also being addressed. For instance, it focuses on the types and quantities of toxins that armies, not terrorist cells, would need. The components of chemical weapons are readily available: industrial chemicals are sold in bulk, yet unlike their nuclear equivalent, only limited scientific and engineering knowledge is needed to turn them against us.

Recent history shows us that extremists entertain no qualms about the acquisition and use of such weapons; and they are willing to use primitive delivery systems. In 1995, terrorists from the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo released a nerve agent on the Tokyo subway which led to 13 deaths and left hundreds more suffering ill effects.

Preventing and prohibiting misuse without impeding the beneficial development of science and technology is a delicate balancing act but a necessary one. All nations must face up to these challenges and consider the implications for the CWC’s verification regime in the short, near and long term. For instance, will the declaration and inspection provisions that apply to the chemical industry still be relevant? We cannot afford to be reactive. If unchecked, this threat has the potential to cause devastation on a vast scale.

This is a watershed moment for the convention and for the international community. We must summon the political will to strengthen regulation and ensure relevance in the modern world. The duty to prevent chemical development for weapons must be enforced in all nations, and states must be prepared to take steps nationally to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals.

As the current situation in Syria demonstrates, the danger posed by these weapons is not an abstract issue. The existence of that country’s chemical arsenal is a reminder of the threats we face.

Any use of such weapons is abhorrent. Preventing this and holding to account those who use them must remain a priority for the international and scientific communities alike.

We now face a new threat in the shape of bioterrorism. A week after the hijacked airplane attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were sent to two senators and several media organisations in the country. Five people died, and the attack showed how psychologically and economically damaging an attack of this kind can be: the US estimated the overall cost to be around $1 billion. The consequences of future biological attacks could be even worse, from the global release of infectious diseases to effects on public health, business and international travel.

Last week I attended the opening of the seventh review conference of the (BTWC) in Geneva, Switzerland. The convention bans states from acquiring or using biological weapons. It is a cornerstone of the international arms control regime and was the first treaty to ban an entire category of weapons. The UK made the original proposal for a ban in 1968 and has been at the forefront of efforts to make the convention as effective as possible.

As well as addressing threats, the convention also considers the benefits of scientific advancement. Recent developments in medicine, agriculture and industry have had huge benefits across the globe. Left unchecked and unregulated, though, they could cross the line from beneficial application to use as weapons – the “dual-use” problem.

Synthetic biology is a good example of this duality. On the one hand, it has led to the synthesis in Escherichia coli and yeast of a precursor of the drug , a key tool in the fight against malaria. On the other, synthetic biology could also be exploited for harmful purposes, including the creation of new biological warfare agents.

To do

If the BTWC is to continue to be a valuable tool, it is important both that policy-makers understand the potential of new advances in science and that scientists understand their responsibilities under the convention to avoid misuse or loss of control of potentially dangerous technologies.

It is for this reason that the review conference of the BTWC is so important. Since the previous five-yearly review conference in 2006, parties to the convention have been discussing and promoting biosafety and biosecurity, promoting oversight of dual-use biological research and working on raising awareness among scientists and students. However, if the BTWC is to be genuinely effective, this month’s conference has to go further. I was therefore delighted to be able to present Esther Ng of Singapore – studying at the University of Oxford – with a prize recognising her insightful essay on ““.

More comprehensive efforts are needed to address the apparent widespread lack of awareness among life scientists of biosecurity and of their responsibilities under the convention. The convention also needs to reach out to a new generation of scientists with increasingly global links.

At the conference, which runs until 22 December, the UK is proposing the formation of a group to review and respond to scientific and technological advances. The group would bring together scientists, diplomats and international organisations to discuss the implications of rapidly developing fields such as synthetic biology and nanotechnology.

There is much common ground amongst delegations from all over the world on many of the key issues facing the convention. There is an opportunity for agreement on a more frequent review of scientific and technological issues affecting it, and for better integrating scientific communities within that process. Many scientists are keen to be involved and have much to contribute. I hope the parties to the convention are bold and seize that opportunity.

is at the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He is the member of Parliament for North East Bedfordshire