OPPONENTS of human cloning are not short of allies. the Pope, presidents
Clinton of the US and Chirac of France, the G8 industrial nations at their
Denver Summit in 1997, the European Union at its Amsterdam meeting, the Council
of Europe and UNESCO, for starters. So two cheers for Gregory Pence for pointing
out that many of the dreadful fears discovered by these eminent authorities are
little more than emperor’s new clothes, which either do not exist or are so
threadbare as to constitute an affront to public decency.

His book is a rattling good polemic against the rush to condemn human
cloning. He has great fun disinterring what many of today’s bioethicists had to
say on the horrors of IVF when the birth of Louise Brown was announced in 1978.
He cites a theologian arguing then on the dangers: “No one has the moral right
to endanger a child while there is yet the option of whether the child shall
come into existence.” His reply is the old Yiddish joke: “First, life is so
terrible! Better not to have existed, but who is so lucky: not one in a
łŮłó´ÇłÜ˛ő˛ą˛Ô»ĺ.”

This is knockabout stuff, but nothing more than most of the immediate
reaction to Dolly deserved. Popular fears have been fuelled by science fiction
and films such as The Boys from Brazil, while depressingly the
arguments of the academics are little better. Much has been written on how human
cloning might “instrumentalise” the offspring. As Pence argues in Who’s
Afraid of Human Cloning?, this is to fall into the trap of genetic
determinism. All the reports on human cloning have noted the folly of ignoring
upbringing and environment.

Such effects have been demonstrated in all the twin studies. In extreme
cases, some relatively rare genetic factors can be very penetrating, as in the
case of a genetic disorder such as cystic fibrosis (CF). But even in such
extreme cases much can be done to modify genetic effects: modern treatment has
doubled the median life expectancy of CF sufferers.

Nevertheless, we still find it solemnly pronounced that “it is not at all
clear to what extent a clone will truly be a moral agent”. The confusion stems
from a failure to be realistic about normal sexual reproduction, much of which
can be instrumental in that children have always been considered both as
potential workers and as props for their parents’ old age. Chinese peasants and
Scottish dukes alike demand male heirs. The motives that surround human
conception are irrelevant to the status of the offspring as a moral agent. After
all, it can be argued that two-thirds of American women aged between 15 and 44
are at risk of unintended pregnancy and that every year in the US, 1.5 million
pregnancies are unintended. All these offspring are moral agents, whatever the
intention or lack of it that attended their conception.

But why have I not offered three cheers for Pence? It’s because he fails to
confront the safety issues raised by Ian Wilmut’s work. He notes how
experimental techniques such as ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection) were
made widely available before shown to be safe. He knows that two wrongs do not
make a right, but he still wants to plunge into human cloning.

He also fails to consider the consequences of pressure on infertile women.
Even in countries such as Britain that regulate human fertilisation and
embryology, the pressure can be severe. Finally, he ignores the evidence that
being an identical twin may be undesirable. In proper American libertarian
fashion, he wants to keep the state out of the bedroom.

Most of the heads of state demanded virtually instant advice from their
advisory bioethics bodies. President Jacques Chirac of France called on the
French national committee. Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission,
turned to his Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology.
President Clinton demanded that his recently created National Bioethics Advisory
Commission report to him within 90 days. In Britain, the House of Commons Select
Committee on Science and Technology was, appropriately enough, the first body to
issue a report, on 18 March.

So, how well did these bodies perform in helping the politicians and the
public to answer questions on the implications of the Dolly breakthrough for
biomedical research? Essentially, there are three simple tests that can be
applied. First, do they get the science right, and make it intelligible to the
public? Secondly, have they taken time to reflect and not panic? Thirdly, and
most importantly, do they set out the ethical arguments clearly but not
dogmatically? Their modest aim should be to stimulate public discussion. The
reader must be able to follow, and dispute, the central moral arguments.

So what might the scorecard of the recent reports look like? On getting the
science right, the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology
reported speedily and, as usual, published verbatim the evidence it was given.
The American commission set out the evidence in detail on 9 June, but its report
is heavy going for the lay reader. The French national committee expounded the
science clearly and simply, showing the value of a standing body with a strong
scientific component.

Did they take the time to reflect? The British select committee combined
speed with sobriety of judgment. The French and German reports bear some marks
of intense political pressure for speed. UNESCO held a meeting at which the
French report was closely examined and then sensibly decided that more time was
needed for reflection.

The most important task is to set out the ethical arguments clearly but not
dogmatically. The French and German reports suffer from dogmatism and overuse
the rhetoric of cloning being “an attack on human dignity”. So too does the
report of the European Commission’s group, but this simply reflects its
accustomed style of pronouncement. The American report, Cloning Human
Beings, stands out for the clarity of its exposition of a wide range of
ethical arguments.

For a European audience, the French report may be the most consequential. Its
arguments need critical examination. It begins well, with a refutation of
genetic determinism: genetic identity must not be confused with a person’s
identity. Unfortunately this argument is immediately lost when it stresses the
unique character of human beings, as though identical twins were not unique
individuals.

The report then argues that human cloning would be an inadmissible
“instrumentalisation” of the person—producing in our image for our own
use. Yet do we always create children for their own sakes? There has always been
an instrumental side to normal sexual reproduction. Peasant societies often see
children as a means of making a living, while in industrial societies children
may be seen as security for parental old age. Perhaps it is just as well that
human cloning is not yet feasible. We need better arguments for banning it.

We might start by arguing against any unnecessary creation of genetically
identical human beings. This would imply restrictions on the use of fertility
drugs. We should also ban the use of the risky Roslin technique for humans on
safety grounds, on the basis that infertility is not a life-threatening disease
and that medicine should not apply risky techniques to baby-farming. The
technique may become safer. Should we then still ban even limited and tightly
regulated use of human cloning for human reproduction?

The bioethics bodies must try harder.