THE memoir of a remarkable and controversial woman, Helen Caldicott’s candid
autobiography A Desperate Passion is an engaging read. She became an
antinuclear activist in 1972 when she was a paediatrician at the Adelaide
Children’s Hospital. At that time there was considerable unease in Australia
about French atmospheric bomb tests in the Pacific.

Caldicott, working with children with cystic fibrosis, was shown a leaked
government document explaining that Adelaide had been exposed to particularly
high levels of radioactive fallout from the French tests. Knowing that radiation
can induce genetic disease, especially in children, this spurred her to campaign
across Australia against nuclear weapons and nuclear power.

In 1975, Caldicott moved to the US to work at Harvard Medical School. With a
few other antinuclear doctors, she revitalised Physicians for Social
Responsibility (PSR), a moribund group that had earlier done important work on
the health hazards of exposure to radiation. In the early 1960s, for example,
PSR doctors published data on the levels of radioactive strontium-90 in babies’
teeth—the radioactivity had come from atmospheric bomb tests. Nationwide
protests by angry American mothers were a powerful factor in persuading
President John Kennedy to negotiate the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which
banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

In 1978, Caldicott gave up medicine to become president of the reborn PSR,
and two years later she formed Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND).
The two organisations were at the forefront of the popular nuclear disarmament
movement during its heyday in the 1980s, a movement fuelled in the US by
Caldicott’s extraordinary passion, energy and commitment. An eloquent orator,
she could attract and rouse audiences of thousands.

PSR and WAND flourished under her leadership. But trouble was brewing. In
1980, Bernard Lown, a Harvard cardiologist, decided to establish the
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) to bring in
Soviet doctors. It was made painfully clear to Caldicott that she was not
welcome in IPPNW, and in 1982 she resigned from PSR, though she remained an
energetic antinuclear activist. Her opponents believed that although Caldicott
was a good lobbyist, she was too emotional and political.

An example is her description of plutonium as the most toxic substance on
earth. In her words: “Only one-millionth of a gram caused cancer.�

Plutonium is exceedingly toxic and it is possible to justify scientifically
the statement that two-millionths of a gram of plutonium-238 inhaled into
the lung will very probably cause lung cancer. But the other main plutonium
isotopes are significantly less toxic, particularly when ingested.

Campaigners like Caldicott often face a dilemma. Their best bet for achieving
their objective is to mobilise public opinion in favour of their cause.
Selecting and exaggerating facts may well be seen as the best technique for
reaching the heart rather than the mind.

The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear-reactor accident reinvigorated Caldicott and she
lectured to groups all over the US about the medical consequences of the
accident. But she was accused of being a scaremonger. Dispirited, Caldicott
returned to her homeland. It was not a happy homecoming. A foray into
environmental politics was unsuccessful.

The life of a successful activist, with its constant travel, also took its
toll on family life. A traumatic and draining separation and divorce from her
husband Bill put paid to her activism until she began work on her autobiography.
But a woman with Caldicott’s passion and energy will surely not stay quiet for
much longer. We can expect to hear from her again.

Both large and small countries are likely to use the Gulf War to rethink
their military postures. For some, the change may be relatively small. The
US – and to a lesser extent the USSR – will probably wish to maintain their
capability to exert military force worldwide, to influence, and if necessary
intervene in the affairs of other countries.

With the end of the Cold War, however, major European powers such as
Britain and France will hopefull move towards defensive postures (even if
the Gulf conflict has emphasised the need to keep some forces for rapid
deployment for use in other regions). And for many smaller powers, the main
lesson of the Gulf War may indeed be that, as a result of recent technological
advances, the best value for military budgets comes from adopting defensive
policies.

Whether offensive or defensive strategies are being reassessed, the
Gulf War has brought home the fact that automation has become the cornerstone
of virtually all new military systems – so much so that we are moving steadily
towards a fully automated battlefield. Each successful launch of a Tomahawk
or Patriot missile strengthens the confidence of both the military commanders
and the politicians in such weapons systems.

These new military technologies can be grouped under three main headings.
First, there are technologies using a range of sensors on board satellites
and manned aircraft, which allow the precise location and identification
of targets and the identification and tracking, in real time, of mobile
enemy forces deep within their own territory. Secondly, there are the sensor
and guidance technologies for smart ‘fire-and-forget’ missiles; these are
able to detect, identify and attack armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and
warships, as well as hardened fixed targets like command and control centres,
in all weathers and battlefield conditions. Once fired, they do not require
further instructions from the launch platform. Finally, there are the computerised
command, control, communications and intelligence systems.

Each of these new technologies has clear offensive uses. But each also
has the capability of being built into defensive weapons systems. For example,
new antitank missiles, particularly when used from helicopters, are making
main battle tanks obsolete. Furthermore, research has shown that antitank
helicopters are already very cost-effective; one helicopter should, in battle,
be able to destroy 17 times its value in tanks before being shot down.

The implications of all this are that new military technologies are
making conventional defence increasingly cost-effective compared wth offence
(although this argument does not apply to nuclear defence, such as the Strategic
Defense Initiative). In other words, it is becoming cheaper to destroy the
opposition’s main weapons of invasion and occupation, such as battle tanks,
long-range combat aircraft and large warships – than to deploy them oneself.
The result is to increase the activities of the military forces – ranging
from their size, structure, weapons and logistics to their training, manoeuvres
and war games – can be designed to provide an effective defence, but with
virtually no offensive capability.

Schemes for non-offensive defence vary in their details. But they share
a reliance on the use of short-range missiles against attack by, for example,
main battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships. These missiles are precisely
the type of weapons that are demontrating their effectiveness in the Gulf
conflict. They are also cost-effective, as the cost of a missile is roughly
proportional to the square of its range.

Critics often claim that non-offensive defence uses only complex and
highly centralised technologies. This is not so. Weapons and technologies,
particularly when deployed by advanced Western nations, would preferably
be chosen for specific tasks. and operated well within their design characteristics.
Emphasis would be given to missiles that are simple to operate and cheap
to produce in large quantities. But there would be a judicious mix of antitank
missiles, anti-tank mines, antitank cannon, anti-aircraft missiles and light
anti-aircraft guns.

Such a defence strategy – including command, control and communications
centres – could be decentralised and would, therefore, not present obvious
targets for enemy bombardment. This is particularly true for a defensive
system based on comparatively small, independent units, armed with short-range
weapons.

Short-range systems also have the advantage of offering a choice of
weapons. Short-range missiles, for example, can be guided by laser, active
or passive radar, infrared, millimetre waves, fibre optics, and so on. Similarly,
mines can be fitted with various types of sensors, whether seismic, magnetic,
acoustic or infrared. Choice increases both the scope for surprise and the
effectiveness of the defence.

Democracy in East European countries and the USSR can only succeed if
both the Warsaw pact and NATO restructure those parts of their military
forces assigned to Europe to make them non-offensive. Negotiations between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact could, following further agreements to reduce conventional
forces, lead to the introduction of non-offensive defence strategies by
both sides.

The Gulf War has demonstrated that the negotiation of mutal non-provocative
defence strategies (including adequate verification) would be in tune with
technological possibilities. Unfortunately, the war is also likely to ensure
that, for the foreseeable future, the major powers will provide part of
their military forces with long-range capabilities for rapid deployment.
It may well be that the smaller powers benefit first from the new defensive
technologies.

Frank Barnaby is a former director of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute.