Dream on
Feedback mentions recursive dreams (28 July). There is a film on this theme, or perhaps its inverse. In , made in 1952 and directed by Ren茅 Clair, the young hero gets into trouble, goes to sleep to escape, and dreams. In this dream he gets into trouble once more and so goes to sleep to escape…
In each dream he is prompted by an old man telling him “it was much better in my day”, so each dream takes him one generation back. He ends up in the Stone Age.
Superluminal siblings
Robbie and Fred are twins who live together. Wearing identical suits, they leave their house at the same time heading in opposite directions. One twin carries a hidden green wallet; the other has a red one. The wallets are not visible.
Unfortunately, Robbie is mugged and the redness of his wallet is revealed. In quantum terms he is measured and forced to take a value.
An observer can now deduce that Fred’s wallet is green, and if put to the test this will prove to be the case no matter where or when Fred is interrogated.
There is no need for faster-than-light communication or spooky interaction at distance 鈥� just knowledge of the initial conditions. I can’t see anything wrong with this analogy. Am I missing something?
鈥� No, it’s exactly right.
E-jinks
Your mention of Google’s use of the number e (approximately 2.71828) on advertising billboards (21 July, p 38) reminded me of a story about the physicist Richard Feynman.
While working in Los Alamos during the second world war, the remoteness and lack of entertainment led him to experiment with lock-picking, including opening the combination locks that protected some of his colleagues’ filing cabinets: it is said that he left fictitious notes from a spy in them. .
Did we choose to publish this?
I have a question relating to Chris Frith’s article on free will (11 August, p 46). It seems that the agreed definition of “will” or “self” is the reported awareness of intent. Is that approximately correct? So for instance in Libet’s experiment, the brain activity that instigated lifting a finger occurring prior to the urge to do so is seen as evidence against a free will or determinate self.
I understand that if I prick my finger there is a delay between the stimulus and the awareness of the prick in my consciousness. Why is the same not true for self-awareness? It seems logical that the “self” is not the same as the “awareness of self-hood” that the experiment tests for. Therefore I could reasonably expect a delay between what my self decides and the awareness that I have decided. Has this possibility been addressed?
Free will is, of course, at best both partial 鈥� in that we are clearly subject to influences of which we are not always fully aware 鈥� and intermittent 鈥� in that there are times when we do not have the ability to exercise it at all: for example, when sleeping or anaesthetised. However, it does not follow logically that it does not exist at all 鈥� though it has so far proved impossible to reconcile fully with today’s scientific ideas.
I think Bertrand Russell said that determinism may be true but, by definition, it cannot be known to be true. Human beings could no more know determinism to be true than a recording device playing the message “Determinism is true” (or, indeed, conversely “Free will exists”) does.
Chris Frith’s interesting article failed to address the mathematical and physical dimensions.
In an Argand diagram, a complex number is represented as a point on a plane in which one axis is “real” and the other is “imaginary”. This is a very poor choice of terms because an “imaginary” number is just a real as a “real” number. Numbers are simply mental constructs that can be manipulated by logical rules. (Imaginary numbers are no more imaginary than irrational numbers are irrational, and there is no need to throw anybody overboard.)
Anyway, Minkowski space-time is very much like a four-dimensional Argand diagram in which there are three real axes representing space and one imaginary axis representing time. Consideration of space-time from “outside” our universe puts time on a similar footing as space. This point of view is sometimes referred to as “block time” Einstein himself apparently thought this way, as when he wrote to the widow of his childhood friend Michele Besso: “People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.”
It thus occurs to me: if the passage of time is an illusion, is not free will an illusion as well? Subsequently a decision was made that I would stop thinking along these lines.
What Life?
I’m confused: could someone explain this / thing to me (1 September, p 28)?
It’s just a multi-user computer game isn’t it: people sitting in front of computer keyboards? Or has Matrix-style virtual reality happened while I wasn’t looking?
Does the “burgeoning property portfolio” mentioned actually exist or is it just imaginary? Does the $1 actually exist or is it play money? Are Catherine Fitzpatrick’s “tenants” people in actual buildings or just in imaginary buildings in a computer game? Do people actually pay real money to have imaginary rooms in a computer game? Isn’t her business just an easy way to exploit people who need to get out more?
As for people with “childlike avatars” having sex 鈥� it’s not unusual (in the real world) for men to like their wives or girl friends to (say) dress as school girls or whatever, but these people aren’t even doing that 鈥� they’re just sitting at their computers 鈥� aren’t they?
Am I missing something crucial here or are the Nigras and their flying penises the only people with any slight grip on sanity in this affair?
What are gods good for?
I was pleased to note that Helen Phillips (1 September, p 32) discussed the relationship between religious belief and morality without any consideration of whether any such belief is true. This is logical since although most religions have the same central moral codes, such are the core beliefs that they are usually mutually exclusive. Since the validity of most individual religions would require all others to be false, we can be sure that most religions are not “true” in any objective way.
As pointed out in the article, this leaves religion-based morality as nothing more than the equivalent of scare stories for children about bogeymen who will punish them. That’s not necessarily a bad thing, but it is something that leaves me a little uneasy. It is equivalent to saying it would be good for people to believe in fairies if they think the fairies say they should act in a moral fashion.
I wonder whether anyone has looked at the behaviour of people who lose their faith. In my experience they do not become axe-murderers or drug dealers, or in any way lose their moral values 鈥� except in very specific ways, such as becoming more tolerant of behaviour which is generally accepted but forbidden by their former faith.
What are gods good for?
What’s the point of religion (1 September, p 32)? Modern male-dominated religions exist to give a few men power over lots of other men, and to give all men power over all women.
Religion also allows otherwise quite sensible people to let others do their thinking for them; thinking about really serious things is difficult. And it exists to relieve people of the fear of death.
All the rest is mere trappings designed to distinguish one religion from another.
The essence of religion is the search for, and expression of, meaning 鈥� the kind of meaning that transcends the individual. This may have ethical consequences, but it is not ethics that drives it, significant though religious moral insight may be.
Life in all its aspects, including morality, is given added significance by being set within a larger, transcendent framework, in a way which would seem to be unique to human beings. It depends upon our ability to reflect on 鈥� and the power of language to express 鈥� what may not be directly observable.
This is a risky activity, and not all forms of religious expression make good sense. But some do. Look at what some religions have achieved to be convinced that the search for transcendent meaning may be as rewarding as the scientific search for order in nature. They may even coincide.
Malton, North Yorkshire, UK
An obvious function of religion is to provide a system of thought which purports to give us control over natural events. Many “religious” practices turn out to be justified scientifically: for example, in a hot climate it makes sense to be wary of shellfish, which can produce ptomaine poisoning, and of pork, which carries trichinosis.
But study of religious practices in relation to marriage makes it very clear that a major function of religion is to control the reproductive behaviour of women.
Until the advent of DNA testing, certainty of paternity could only be guaranteed if a male had control over his sexual partner or, in a very recent development, had trust in her choice to be faithful.
The inculcation of a high level of sexual guilt, primarily in the female, is a major function of religious education.
Search the sacred texts for the origin of evil, and you will find 鈥� in the story of Eve in Genesis, for example, or the Whore of Babylon in Revelation – that it is female sexual desire.
Hull, East Yorkshire, UK
Linking the development of religion to the need for moral structure is surely a red herring. Religions are more likely to have evolved in an attempt to make sense of the randomness of everyday life: to try to explain the unknowable.
In a science magazine, not only was religion discussed but it made the front cover. If I’d wanted to hear about religion I would have gone to church.
鈥� Religion is a feature of the natural world, and as fit a subject of inquiry for science 鈥� and for New 杏吧原创 鈥� as any other.
Beaver explosion
Gail Vines gives only one side of the beaver story (25 August, p 42). Conservationists tend to view reintroduction of the beaver as something of a crusade. When they claim it has been successful, the question should be: successful for whom or for what?
Many reasons were cited in support of the decision not to allow the pilot reintroduction of the animals in Scotland, including the lack of any exit strategy in the event of things going wrong. The beaver is a protected species and cannot therefore be shot or lethally trapped. There are many valid reasons why landowners and farmers do not want even a trial reintroduction. And they are the primary stakeholders.
Experience in the Baltic countries shows that there is reason to be cautious. In 1927 two pairs of beavers imported from Norway were released into the Stende river in Latvia. In 1952, several more pairs were imported from Voronez in Russia, and at the beginning of the 1960s beavers were brought in from Belarus, Lithuania and Russia.
Now, according to the , “there are approximately 80,000 beavers in Latvia 鈥� that is, about six beaver pairs are active per 10 square kilometres”. At this population density, “beavers dam up drainage ditches, as well as small rivers and streams, and if the terrain is flat, large territories are flooded”, the institute says. If you own only a few hectares and you are unlucky, your entire holding may be lost.
Turn down the bass!
Your interesting article on noise demonstrated its pernicious effect on our lives (25 August, p 6). Unfortunately, it neglected to mention the type of noise pollution characterised by repetitive, low-frequency, drum-like beats, common in certain types of modern “music” and often encountered in domestic situations. These noises can be maddening, even if they are not particularly loud. The worst part is the anger, anxiety and frustration caused by the frequent inability of victims of this type of pollution to prevent it.
Unlike higher-frequency sounds, this type of noise is not usually absorbed by building structures. It causes serious psychological harm to many people, and it is about time laws were updated to reflect this.
Rebound reprised
I agree with Sadie Williams that there is a possibility of money saved by energy efficiency being used on something else that requires more energy (18 August, p 18). But not everyone will instantly spend that money on something that damages the planet. They may save it for their child to go to university, and that child may develop a renewable, eco-friendly fuel.
The question of the energy rebound effect has been widely debated by economists for many years.
It seems to have been raised first by William Stanley Jevons in his 1865 book in which he said essentially that increasing the fuel efficiency of iron production led to more iron being produced and hence to a dramatic increase in the consumption of coal.
The UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs commissioned a study on the effect in 2005, available via .
It found that for the UK economy at least, reducing energy demand does reduce carbon dioxide emissions, though by about a quarter less than you would expect if there were no rebound.
A couple of reasons for this are that it costs money to save energy and that people tend (in the UK) to spend savings on less energy-intensive activities.
Antarctic threatened too
Your editorial on the rush by several nations to stake a claim to parts of the Arctic seabed was timely and informative (1 September, p 5). It was, however, optimistic in its portrayal of what is happening in Antarctica, where the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 froze national claims to territory on the continent.
The dozen nations who were signatories in 1959 agreed to set aside their territorial claims for a period of 50 years. To the best of my knowledge there is no realistic prospect that it will be renewed when it expires in 2009. The US is already building an ice road to its base at the South Pole, and Russia is setting up “scientific bases” in every sector of the continent. Other nations, notably the UK, Chile and Argentina, are involved in the rapid development of tourism there. It all looks worryingly similar to the “gold rush” developing in the Arctic.
For there to be any prospect of Antarctica remaining a pristine wilderness, renewal of the Antarctic Treaty must be made as urgent a priority as the development of a similar agreement to cover the Arctic.
Testing drugs
I was impressed by the mainly logical and compelling article by Paula J. Caplan and Emily H. Cohen, arguing that the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations need to be revised to prevent a repetition of the problems experienced with Prozac and Avandia. There was, however, one crucial missing element: while the authors outlined many flaws in the FDA process, they failed to show that any of these problems would have been prevented by tweaking these guidelines (11 August, p 19).
If the pharmaceutical companies are sticking to the bare minimum of testing prescribed by the FDA guidelines, and these guidelines are flawed, then they are risking not only patients’ lives but also their brand names and their reputations, not to mention the cost of civil lawsuits. If they are exceeding this bare minimum, then changing the guidelines may not improve matters significantly.
Perhaps, then, the best course of action would be to show the pharmaceutical companies, their shareholders and their investors that investing a little more in clinical trials might save the shame, and cost, of litigation in the future. This assumes, of course, that there is a monetary advantage to the pharmaceutical companies of not slipping up. If there is no such advantage, then why not?
Paula J. Caplan and Emily H. Cohen write:
鈥� It is hard to connect one specific flaw in the research guidelines directly to one specific real-life consequence. This is partly due to the clouds of secrecy that have made it impossible to know what research results the drug companies have provided to whom and at what point, or to what extent they have accurately and fully reported their results. You can be sure 鈥� as internal memos exposed in recent lawsuits make clear 鈥� that these companies have weighed the financial cost of paying damages in lawsuits from consumers harmed by drugs that the companies knew to be dangerous against the huge profits they make when new drugs go on the market before enough damning evidence becomes public.