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This Week’s Letters

History at stake

A. C. Grayling, replying to Mark Vernon’s claim (26 July, p 21) that no “natural philosopher” was burnt at the stake by the Catholic church for practising science, cites Cecco d’Ascoli and the astronomers at the University of Salamanca as counter-examples.

A quick internet check reveals, however, that Cecco was burnt for heresy following an attack on Dante, not for the practising of science.

Likewise, it was astrologers and not astronomers at the University of Salamanca who attracted the attentions of the Inquisition.

Grayling’s claim that “the distinction between alchemy and occult practices and what we now regard as legitimate science was clear to very few people between the 14th and early 17th centuries” is disingenuous: we can make that distinction clearly now and thus confirm that Grayling has not rebutted Vernon.

From Mark Vernon

Thank you for publishing my letter: I have done as A. C. Grayling suggests in his reply. I find that the individuals he lists did meet horrid ends, and all quite explicitly for practising occultism and/or astrology.

The story of Cecco d’Ascoli appears in George Steiner’s latest, My Unwritten Books. In it, Steiner reflects on d’Ascoli’s capacity for envy because he wasn’t quite a genius. This seems to have played a part in his downfall, though his acts were the main event. A professor of astrology at the University of Bologna in Italy, he cast a horoscope of Christ, propounded theories about the agency of demons and generally made enemies, not least by attacking Dante’s Comedy. He was condemned in 1324, though it wasn’t until 1327 that the accusations against him took him to the stake.

The “cleaning-up” of the University of Salamanca is told in Henry Charles Lea’s History of the Inquisition of Spain – in volume four, book eight, chapter eight, entitled “Sorcery and Occult Arts”, to be precise. Lea writes: “…the Inquisition, the Suprema, in 1582, attacked [astrology] in its stronghold, the University of Salamanca, sending thither in March the Valladolid inquisitor, Juan de Arrese, with an edict condemning all the practices of the so-called science… on March 31st [Arrese] writes that he is still gathering evidence against the teachers of astrology, among whom are some who treat of invocation of demons and necromancy…”

Lea himself is unclear just what befell these unfortunate individuals: “The documents before me fail to state what action the Suprema took with the professors and teachers”. Maybe that has become clearer in subsequent research.

It does seem to be the case that even if the boundaries between astronomy, astrology, occultism and so on were blurred up to the early 17th century, the church was quite clear what it condemned – and that wasn’t astronomy. In fact, it appears to be what any rationalist today would condemn. They wouldn’t recommend the stake, of course – though they would risk a flaming.

London, UK

Journal jaundice

Priya Shetty took a very one-sided view of scientific publishing in the developing world (12 July, p 20). As a member of teaching staff at the , from 1986 to 1998 and editor of the Journal of the Geological Society of Jamaica from 1989 to 1991, I feel I have first-hand experience.

In truth, the principal stakeholders – the scientists themselves, their universities and their funding agencies – want to see their best research published in the best journals, which rarely means in the local journals favoured by Shetty.

This is hardly surprising, and is as true for the University of Oxford or Harvard University as it is for the University of the West Indies.

As Richard Smith observed in The Trouble with Medical Journals (RSM Press, 2006, p 186): “Journals in developing countries… are often edited by a lone editor who does everything, don’t receive enough articles, are desperately short of resources and go unnoticed by the rest of the world. Often they are not even read by the people they are published for.”

Publishing an important paper in a leading journal reaches the widest possible audience and brings honour to all involved. An academic in a developing country should be congratulated for such an achievement, not criticised.

Breast bank

You report research on formula milk ingredients (12 July, p 38). This is funded by companies hoping to profit from efforts to mimic human milk.

If society is concerned about the well-being of the ultimate consumers – the babies who ingest these new fluids – a different solution to feeding the small minority who cannot be breastfed is possible. Investment in human milk banks would be a low-cost, low-technology solution and is feasible even in adverse circumstances – as demonstrated by the work of iThemba Lethu (), a South African milk bank dedicated to providing donated milk to AIDS orphans.

In a richer country such as the UK, if the will existed, milk banks could distribute to all babies orphaned or otherwise unable to breastfeed from their mothers. Some hospitals already have such facilities, and many very premature babies are saved by donated milk. It is up to all of us to remember that there are non-commercial ways to approach the problem of ensuring that babies receive a good start in life.

It's a dog's life… again

How many laboratory animals underwent medical or surgical procedures so that Lou Hawthorne could pose with his three cloned dogs (19 July, p 44)? How many other animals will experience unnecessary suffering in order for obscenely rich people to acquire designer pets?

Smells like… what?

I must take issue with Mick O’Hare’s assertion that an anosmia “sufferer” experiences “agony” (19 July, p 46). I have never smelled a thing since birth, unless the irritation of ammonia fumes counts as a smell.

Lyall Watson, in his book Jacobson’s Organ, asserts that anyone without a sense of smell would feel suicidal. I do not feel the slightest loss, nor do I have suicidal tendencies.

My life experience of other people’s sense of smell is of hearing a long litany of complaints about the smell of boiling cabbage, farm slurry… and my (occasional) farts.

Mick O’Hare writes:

• I should have said “late-onset anosmia”. Having once had taste and smell and then losing them can be agony. Many who have never experienced these senses tell me it’s neither here nor there. Suicides have been recorded among sufferers of late-onset anosmia.

Naturally superheavy

Tim Dean quotes David Hinde of the , who believes that superheavy elements may not form in supernovae because of the very short spontaneous-fission half-lives of necessary intermediates (26 July, p 32). If the bottom-up synthesis of long-lived superheavy nuclides cannot work, what about a top-down process featuring neutron-rich material like that found in neutron stars?

Many observed “gamma-ray burst” events (GMBs) are thought to result from neutron stars coalescing. These are very energetic events indeed, but it may be possible that their ejecta would include very large, neutron-rich nuclei.

Such events are much rarer than supernovae, so even if they generate long-lived, neutron-rich superheavy isotopes, these will be rare. Has anyone looked at the spectra of the afterglows of these GMBs? Or searched for signs of superheavy nuclei in cosmic rays?

For the record

• We described the Iberian lynx as a “big cat” (2 August, p 6). It is not a member of the Pantherinae (big cats like tigers) but of the Felinae (all smaller cats, including domestic cats).

• We said that “states that relinquish any ambition to build conventional nuclear stations will be given the opportunity to buy the new secure reactors” (2 August, p 34). The deal offered by the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is actually that the countries agree not to build fuel-enrichment and reprocessing plants, in exchange for a guaranteed supply of fuel for their existing power plants – and then for the “reactor in a box” when or if it becomes available.

• An editing error had us saying that the Rocket Racing League was founded in 1995 (26 July, p 29). It was actually 2005.

Reason, to be cheerful

Your special was enlightening, entertaining, and frustrating: mostly frustrating (26 July, p 41). “Reason” isn’t defined in philosopher A. C. Grayling’s introductory overview, while the Archbishop of Canterbury says that “reason” is “the ability to draw sensible conclusions from what was in front of your eyes instead of just reacting blindly”.

Neuroscientist Chris Frith says it’s “an attempt to justify the choice after it has been made”. Professors Miller and Chomsky both conflate “reason” with the premises and assumptions to which it is applied. Artist Keith Tyson has a similar view: that “reason” consists of the facts as fitted to the observer’s “paradigm”.

Bioethicist Tom Shakespeare offers no discernible definition of “reason”, and Roger Penrose reminds us that for every system of rules and assumptions, there will be statements that can’t be proved by the rules. Philosopher Mary Midgley says “reason” is synonymous with what scientists actually do with observations, assumptions and rules. The editors’ concluding essay does not define “reason”.

Rowan Williams’ definition of “reason” came closest to offering definitions that meet the strictures of Occam’s razor, although he finds “reason” defective because it has no necessary premises and assumptions. The other authors who defined “reason” uniformly included assumptions, premises, and observations in their definitions.

May I suggest that “reason” is a tool or a process, in some ways like the software that enables computer operations (that’s just a metaphor, not a banner for artificial intelligence). Both reason and software operate on information, but are not for present purposes themselves “information”. Without information observations and assumptions, reason and software are empty, unproductive, meaningless. Reasoning actors can add the archbishop’s moral rules, or the neuroscientist’s emotions, or any other assumptions they like. But “reason” the process should not be blamed for the perceived evils of incorrect or insufficient moral rules, emotions, assumptions, or observations.

Sarcasm's so simple

Maybe Mary Helen Immordino-Yang would get clearer results in her studies of people with half a brain (12 July, p 44) if she drew a clearer distinction between phenomena purely to do with intonation or “prosody”, like contrastive accent, which is wholly syntactical, and emotive intonations, which are highly dependent on context.

In her examples of “non-linguistic intonation that conveys emotion” – such as contrasting responses to the utterance “I’m going to Timbuktu” of “YOU’RE going?” and “You’re GOING?” – she seems to expect the speaker’s intentions to be conveyed without any reference to the communicative situation.

Stress on the grammatical subject “you” simply means that the speaker had expected some other subject. Stress on the verb “going” simply means that the speaker had expected some other action – that’s all.

Sarcasm doesn’t work without a lot of assumptions on both sides about the speaker and the addressee. If you say “that’s really a splendid job you’ve done here”, the addressee must have considerable knowledge of you in order to understand the utterance as sarcasm; and you must make a lot of assumptions about the addressee’s knowledge of you, if you don’t want your sarcasm to be taken literally and backfire: “Yeah, haven’t I?”

Ding dengue

Debora MacKenzie reports that for a few weeks after contracting one variety of dengue fever you have a kind of immunity that destroys other serotypes, protecting you against the potentially lethal effects of overstimulating your immune system with, say, dengue serotype B, when you already have antibodies against serotype A (19 July, p 15). Has anyone considered deliberate infection with dengue serotype B during this window?

Nothing new in the air

You report that the UK defence company Qinetiq claims to be the first to have an aircraft hovering by pointing the nose up with an excess of propeller thrust over weight (26 July, p 23). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) able to do this have been widely deployed for about 20 years, as have large radio-controlled aerobatic models – effectively UAVs for leisure purposes.

Health and economy

Your editorial and report blaming the International Monetary Fund for poor health outcomes (26 July, p 5) is sadly misconceived. The IMF has to rescue failing economies. As they are failing, of course health intervention reduces. If the rescue is successful and economic growth is obtained, then greater health provision becomes possible again.

There is an inevitable time lag. If the economy failed then health intervention would disappear.

Nuke in a tin

We already have small-scale nuclear reactors powering nuclear submarines and warships. Can someone please explain why these cannot be adapted for civilian terrestrial use – in place of the new “reactor-in-a-box” designs that Phil McKenna describes (2 August, p 34)?

The editor writes:

• The first electricity-generating reactor in the US was in fact based on a submarine reactor design, plonked on land at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1957. One reason most submarine reactor designs are not suitable for countering nuclear proliferation is that they are fuelled with weapons-grade uranium.

Reason, to be cheerful

How incongruous that every contributor to your reason special (26 July, p 41) uses a reasoned argument to attack reason. Of course, this is because reason is the only legitimate tool we have to persuade others to our point of view, and they all know it.

Illegitimate tools include propaganda, PR or the invocation of an “authority” – be it a god, church leader or head of state.

Reason tells us when to use reason, and when not. Emotional or instinctive responses may well be best in some circumstances (looking at a painting or hitting a tennis ball), but the only way we can know when we should use reason is first to apply it: that is, analyse actions and their results.

From Tony Williams

The Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams is certainly correct that reasoning can’t provide the answers to all of the questions we might ask, including the most basic one of all: why does life, the universe and all that exist (26 July, p 44)? It does not follow, however, that the answers to such questions can be found in the mythologies and superstitions of primitive cultures which form the basis of the major religions.

I am content to regard such questions as fundamentally unanswerable and get on with a secular life, as rationally as the flawed nature of humanity allows.

Whaley Bridge, Derbyshire, UK

From David Fremlin

“Absolute convictions… which prescribe unconditional opposition to experiments on non-consenting subjects… are not simply generated by instrumental reason”, writes the Archbishop of Canterbury. He is quite right. Nor are absolute convictions opposing homosexuality in bishops, or those permitting the deliberate infection of monkeys with HIV. However, reason can give us useful guidance in these as in other matters.

Colchester, Essex, UK

From Chrissy Philp

There is nothing wrong with reasoning. In ancient Rome, a “rational” was an accountant. Rationality and reason are bedfellows. Unfortunately, as with accounting, the answers supplied by the rational reasoning process depends on the quantity and quality of information available.

Humans cannot possibly rely on always having all the information they need to produce perfect results from their cogitations, though many scientists have a habit of believing that they do. These don’t seem to be able to get their heads around the fact that reaching accurate answers to big questions that can’t be subjected to detailed physical analysis until every fact is accounted for are doomed from the start. Others might have access to information that is unattainable when using scientific methodology. They might not, of course, but it has to be held in mind as a possibility.

It doesn’t bother me that intuitive-feeling types sometimes get their answers wrong, but that science should have practitioners who can’t handle this simple fact is worrying. It’s not reasoning that is at fault – it’s the “reasoner”.

Bath, Somerset, UK