Quantum astrology
In her review of Massimo Pigliucci’s book Nonsense on Stilts, Amanda Gefter writes that astrology “lacks a consistent explanatory framework. Constellations aren’t real, they are optical illusions resulting from our lack of depth perception when it comes to the night sky, so how can they influence human behaviour?” (22 May, p 48).
Now, I’m no advocate of astrology, but I do know it has nothing to do with constellations. Pretend patterns in the stars are merely landmarks to chart the positions of large or nearby bodies in the solar system. The supposed “influence on human behaviour” is derived from the positional astronomical relationship between those bodies and the Earth. It may be implausible but it is not logically inconsistent.
It is Gefter’s further question about what physical force causes these bodies to have influence that leads to a much clearer distinction between science and pseudoscience. Astrology came about at a time when the physical forces that operate in the universe were mysterious and unknown. It is within environments of incomplete knowledge that pseudoscience thrives.
A perfect example is quantum mechanics. There is a real mystery about what quantum mechanics implies for the make-up of the universe. One day we may solve it, but it is just as possible that this will require a complete revision of our fundamental views.
We can narrow our options by filtering out those that are logically inconsistent: that’s philosophy. What we can’t do is decide on some arbitrary detailed explanation, and then use that to loosely justify some system of cause and effect: that’s pseudoscience.
Unfortunately, pseudoscience prompts an equally unscientific reaction: the denial of a wide gap in scientific knowledge in order to try to stem the flow of pseudoscientific theories. Quantum mechanics is a good example of an area that suffers equally from both.
Denial reasons
Your special report on denial (15 May, p 35) failed to recognise its essential role as a psychological defence mechanism.
Denial kicks in when there is a major threat to our sense of identity, or when we are confronted with something we cannot cope with knowing. When an alcoholic cannot come to terms with the extent of their dependance on drink, denial might arise because at some level the person knows they are ill-equipped to make the necessary lifestyle changes at that time. Denial of a bereavement, on the other hand, coincides with a period of unconscious internal growth, during which the individual gains additional mental resources that allow them to come to terms with their new reality.
In both cases, denial provides mental protection and demonstrates a sophisticated level of knowledge, at some level, that the individual does not have what they need in order to cope with their circumstances.
Climate-change denial arises from similar causes. Preventing catastrophic climate change will require a radical shift in our attitudes and in our economic, manufacturing and political systems. Most people recognise this, and conclude that they and their descendants will be disadvantaged if they make sacrifices for the greater good while others do not.
Unless people can feel confident that changes are being made at a systemic level, the lifestyle changes at an individual level needed to make a difference seem unacceptable. Denial protects us against feelings of guilt and shame that result from the knowledge that our personal failure to act exacerbates our situation.
Seen in this light, widespread climate-change denial demonstrates a sophisticated and healthy response to a real situation; but it is unfortunately a response that prevents the required changes at a collective level from taking place. Denigrating denial in the population at large serves only to strengthen people’s need for it as a defence mechanism.
One way out of this impasse is to publicise the huge amount of work being done by global corporations and governments in carbon emissions reduction, and so show that a substantial effort is already being made. By taking into account the collective beliefs that shape contemporary life in this way, we may rediscover the benefits of living in a more sustainable way.
From Sean Hutton
It is easy to see why the public is confused about certain areas of science, as even prominent scientists can fall prey to arguments from deniers.
During my career as a scientist, I have argued with a Nobel prizewinning physicist who seemed to think global warming and ozone layer depletion were left-wing conspiracies. I have had a fascinating scientific discussion with a well-respected biologist only to later learn that she believed HIV is not responsible for AIDS. Let’s not forget that a scientist’s opinion is as worthless as anybody else’s if it fails to acknowledge experimental evidence.
In condemning the use of the word “denier”, Michael Fitzpatrick misses the point (15 May, p 44). The label serves to distinguish scientists and sceptics from those who engage in disinformation and data manipulation and are not interested in working towards an objective truth. Good scientists adjust theories to fit data. Doing the reverse is scientific fraud. Unfortunately, since denialism occurs outside the formal structures of science, it is not held to the same standard as scientific argument.
How can active disinformation by anyone be defended as free speech? It is damaging to society and prevents progress. People are free to hold opinions, but if they are trying to win arguments by actively fabricating data or misrepresenting scientific research results, let’s call them what they are: liars.
Balnarring, Victoria, Australia
From Richard Milne
Michael Fitzpatrick seems to acknowledge that pseudoscience in the media is a serious problem, but his article offers no solutions, and if anything makes the problem worse. It doesn’t help that he trots out the term “orthodoxy”, which enemies of climate science use to imply that a theory supported by mountains of evidence is no more than a common belief.
Edinburgh, UK
From Dave Ring
When dealing with denial I recommend using humour and personal engagement. Nothing confirms the bias of a denier more reliably than a stern lecture. Keep your tone light or even self-deprecatory, and you may create a chink that lets in a little light.
Take the time to develop a relationship with your opponent, looking for points of possible agreement or at least sympathy, while remaining patient and honest. It will then become increasingly difficult for the denier to ignore the sincerity of your belief.
Palo Alto, California, US
Science of economics
Ernst Fehr is completely right that economic theory should incorporate a bit of realism about human nature (1 May, p 26). From the beginning economists have assumed that people, individually and en masse, behave rationally.
However, rational behaviour in humans is in pretty short supply 鈥� even among scientists. And economists seem convinced that they are engaged in a science, even though their basic postulates are undemonstrable and irrational, and there has never been an economic theory that, once applied in the real world, has had the predicted results. To expect rationality from people is about as irrational as you can get.
From Natasha Lee
Mark Buchanan’s article on Ernst Fehr helped to explain the work of economists and how they can interact with other scientists. In contrast, I felt that John Maddison’s letter in the same issue misunderstood the work of economists by deriding them for considering environmental damage an “externality” (p 24).
When economists refer to “externalities”, they mean that the phenomenon falls outside the economy. For instance, if there is no charge for discharging waste into a river, the waterway will become polluted. This pollution is referred to as an externality because the act of pollution lies outside the economy.
Importantly, classifying something as an externality does not mean it should be ignored, In fact, economists believe that by quantifying the environmental impact and applying a tax on the pollutant then the people and corporations doing the polluting will stop or reduce this action.
Alexandria, New South Wales, Australia
Intergalactic legacy
Craig Venter’s successful implantation of a digitally determined genome sequence into a bacterium has been widely reported (29 May, p 6). Now imagine a future where a successor to Venter is able to digitally reconstruct a set of the best possible sequences of human genomes and incorporate them, in pieces, into bacteria that could autonomously reproduce the sequences.
If these bacteria were then launched into space, the fragmented genome could be reassembled on countless habitable planets in the galaxy. This would be a process similar to that outlined in the theory of directed panspermia proposed in 1973 by Francis Crick and Leslie Orgel ().
Carried on comets, these bacteria could travel from one planetary system to the next, where the genome could reproduce. The legacy of human life could then be thought to have been given an eternal existence in the cosmos.
Glass flowing over
Jay Pasachoff observes that 5000-year-old glass objects have not sagged visibly (24 April, p 25). However, he is wrong to conclude that this tells us anything about the fluidity of modern glass. Over the centuries, glass becomes crystalline. This is why antique glass becomes very brittle, and very old glass is often translucent rather than transparent.
Sagging will only occur relatively early in the lifetime of a glass object. However, it should be within the capability of modern metrology to quantify such flow with nanometre precision within a relatively short time span. Has this been done?
For the record
鈥� Space flight engineer Cody Farnell is at Colorado State University (22 May, p 24).
鈥� We stated that modified bacteria have been used to make a polymer (29 May, p 6). In fact, the 1,3-propanediol we mention is not itself a polymer, but a chemical building block used in the production of polymers.
鈥� When correcting the details about Japanese interplanetary spacecraft (29 May, p 29), we misspelled the name of the Akatsuki Venus orbiter.